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This version now with table of contents, index, numbered paragraphs is edited by Nick Green This material was in unfinished manuscript form and references are incomplete. The quirkiness of Pask's draft style has been kept eg the use of "??" and upper case. Suggestions for corrections willingly accepted. The plates 1 and 2 have not been found and references to missing material have been kept. As in the manuscript subscripted notation has been avoided. This is an aid to email format discussion. There is no section 2.1 in Chapter 1 or point 2 in Chapter 5 (II) SOME FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF C.T XE "C.T" ., Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  AND OF I.A. THEORY. Only Figures 12,13,14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 28 and 35 are known and have been included. They key innovations seem to be represented. IA theory developments from 1993- 1996 are covered in Green "Axioms from Interactions of Actors Theory" (to be published in Kybernetes) http://www.nickgreen.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/PIA2.PDF. Recent reference to the unpublished commercial memo on the Chicago axioms established the primacy of coherence and differentiation as potentially generative of the IA axioms. Gordon listed Coherence Differentiation (Distinction) Evolution Activity (internal and external) Communication and Ability to Learn. See Footnote 11 in "On Gordon Pask" Kybernetes vol 30 vol. 5/6 2001 pp673-682 The importance of this was not realised until a literal interpretation of coherence was undertaken based on Pask's citation of Rescher ie all the set theoretic requirements of Rescher apply to the quantum coherence vector. This is work in progress. Last correction 8th April 2004 nick_green@blueyonder.co.uk  TOC \o \p " " \t "Heading 4,4,Heading 5,5,Heading 6,6,Heading 7,7,Heading 8,8,Heading 9,9" INTERACTIONS OF ACTORS, THEORY AND SOME APPLICATIONS  PAGEREF _Toc69505645 \h 1 INTRODUCTION  PAGEREF _Toc69505646 \h 4 CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES  PAGEREF _Toc69505647 \h 9 1.1 SPECIFICATION OF THE FIELD  PAGEREF _Toc69505648 \h 9 1.3. ESSENCE OF CURRENT STUDIES  PAGEREF _Toc69505649 \h 14 1.4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL  PAGEREF _Toc69505650 \h 14 1.5. UNAVOIDABILITY OF MULTIPLE HISTORIES  PAGEREF _Toc69505651 \h 15 CHAPTER 2. I.A. HISTORY IN OUTLINE  PAGEREF _Toc69505652 \h 17 2.2. PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR CONVERSATIONS  PAGEREF _Toc69505653 \h 19 2.3. P-INDIVIDUALS  PAGEREF _Toc69505654 \h 21 2.4. LANGUAGE, PROTO-LANGUAGE, INTERFACES AND PROTO-LOGICS  PAGEREF _Toc69505655 \h 22 2.5. WHAT IS A PARTICIPANT?  PAGEREF _Toc69505656 \h 23 2.6. WHAT IS A CONVERSATION?  PAGEREF _Toc69505657 \h 23 2.7. WHAT IS AN M-INDIVIDUAL?  PAGEREF _Toc69505658 \h 24 2.8. A TRANSITION  PAGEREF _Toc69505659 \h 24 CHAPTER3. REVISITATION, PRIOR TO ELABORATION.  PAGEREF _Toc69505660 \h 26 3.1. DIALECTICAL AND DIALOGICAL PARADIGMS  PAGEREF _Toc69505661 \h 26 3.2. KINEMATICS AND GENERAL PUNCTUATION  PAGEREF _Toc69505662 \h 26 3.3. SOME RESULTS  PAGEREF _Toc69505663 \h 28 CHAPTER 4. A BROAD OUTLINE OF I.A. THEORY.  PAGEREF _Toc69505664 \h 31 4.1. SOME DIFFERENCES  PAGEREF _Toc69505665 \h 31 4.2. IMPLICIT ETHIC  PAGEREF _Toc69505666 \h 31 4.3. OUTLINE STATEMENT  PAGEREF _Toc69505667 \h 32 4.4. FURTHER EXPLICATION  PAGEREF _Toc69505668 \h 32 4.5. REGARDING DETAILS  PAGEREF _Toc69505669 \h 33 4.6. SUBSEQUENT ORGANIZATION  PAGEREF _Toc69505670 \h 33 CHAPTER 5 SOME SYMBOLIC NOTATIONS REQUIRED FOR TERSE EXPOSITION.  PAGEREF _Toc69505671 \h 37 (I). DEFINITIONS OF MAIN TERMS.  PAGEREF _Toc69505672 \h 37 (II). SOME FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF C.T., Lp AND OF I,A, THEORY.  PAGEREF _Toc69505673 \h 39 (III ). ORIGINAL AND LATER REPRESENTATIONS.  PAGEREF _Toc69505674 \h 43 (IV). ANALOGY RELATIONS ORDAINED BETWEEN CONCEPTS AND MESHES.  PAGEREF _Toc69505675 \h 47 (V). ESSENTIAL GENERALISATION.  PAGEREF _Toc69505676 \h 48 (VI). THE TEMPORALITY AND LOCAL SYNCHRONICITY OF ACTORS.  PAGEREF _Toc69505677 \h 49 CHAPTER 6. MIND, THOUGHT, ACTION AND INTERACTION.  PAGEREF _Toc69505678 \h 51 6.1. INTERNAL DEPENDENCIES  PAGEREF _Toc69505679 \h 51 6.2. ACTORS AS SPECIALISED PARTICIPANTS  PAGEREF _Toc69505680 \h 53 6.3. AMITY GENERATION  PAGEREF _Toc69505681 \h 54 6.4. QUALITY OF AN INTERACTION.  PAGEREF _Toc69505682 \h 55 6.5. ACTORS, COLLECTIIONS OF THEM, AND SOCIETIES.  PAGEREF _Toc69505683 \h 55 6.6. THE REPRESENTATION OF PROCESS.  PAGEREF _Toc69505684 \h 56 CHAPTER 7. INTERKNITTING,  PAGEREF _Toc69505685 \h 59 CHAPTER 8. AN INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY.  PAGEREF _Toc69505686 \h 62 CHAPTER 9, AN IMPORTANT NOTE ON BEER.S.et al, A VIABLE SYSTEM MODEL.  PAGEREF _Toc69505687 \h 65 CHAPTER 10. A VERY SHORT ELUCIDATION OF THE MEANING OF CONCEPTUAL RESONANCE IN ACTORS, INTERACTIONS AND IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.  PAGEREF _Toc69505688 \h 67 CHAPTER 11. PREPOSITIONAL OPERATORS.  PAGEREF _Toc69505689 \h 70 CHAPTER l2 SOME NOTES, OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND THANKS.  PAGEREF _Toc69505690 \h 74 APPENDIX  PAGEREF _Toc69505691 \h 76 Table 1  PAGEREF _Toc69505692 \h 76 Main CT and Lp Conclusions, for the most part previously supported by empirical evidence but not usually dependent upon it rather then upon participant observation.  PAGEREF _Toc69505693 \h 76 Table 2  PAGEREF _Toc69505694 \h 77 Accomplishments of OEC/CICT/IA Theory  PAGEREF _Toc69505695 \h 77 Table 3  PAGEREF _Toc69505696 \h 78 Main C.T./I.A./differences, given that Lp is dynamic  PAGEREF _Toc69505697 \h 78 Table 4  PAGEREF _Toc69505698 \h 79 Summary of Main Principles  PAGEREF _Toc69505699 \h 79 The Figures  PAGEREF _Toc69505700 \h 79 INDEX  PAGEREF _Toc69505701 \h 89  INTRODUCTION A separation of the variant from the invariant is, very often, taken to be the first and the main step in mounting a rational study. Only when this much has been accomplished, usually in terms of a conceptual model XE "model" , is further, more discriminating and deeper enquiry or experiment justifiable; for that matter, more systematic research work of any kind worthwhile and practicably possible. Such a large step, does, on the whole, take a long while to achieve. For example, the century-long march of Newtonian-Science, revised but not entirely rescinded by Einstein, Bohr and Planck ... not to mention Schroedinger, Penrose and others ... could only begin after Newton's insight of excluding or, in one sense, coalescing the multiple variance of volitional influences. Most other disciplines have tried to obtain, have managed, at least, to emulate general invariants, for example, by the conservation XE "conservation"  of energy. Invariance assumes a dominant position if one wishes to improve one's own activity, to use the results of rational investigation, in order to do so. USE constitutes a MAJOR conditional prerequisite, if the results obtained are to remain invariant. In fact, if invariance has been established under ALL possible conditions, then there is a warrant or guarantee that usability will NOT become exceptional. For example, most people would find it difficult to live in a world where the (probably inaccurate, but never mind that), law of gravity did not apply. It is a useful approximation, of course, but we have graviton particles and fluctuating gravitational fields (down deep mine shafts and up high towers), so that the useful law must stand up to the critique of rational approximation if we are to reliably send rockets, even to the moon. Strangely enough, in many social or psychological environments, this kind of enigma is exactly that which people do experience. Perhaps because of that, their experience is neither unexpected nor does it attract much attention. People know well that whatever is demonstrably invariant can neither, in practice, be used to maintain this very invariance nor to contravene it, by injecting variation. Patterns of behaviour, for instance, are changeable, to an astonishing degree by agreements, covert or overt, and by rules, tacit or announced; these, in themselves, do not have to be, frequently are not, linked in some clearly explicated manner to the manifest patterns. Further, the range (Kelly G.) or realm of usefulness of fiats, edicts or principles turns out as being hard to specify if it is, very reasonably, required that we incorporate properly formulated tests for invariance. One consequence of this kind of experience in the social and psychological domain (uniquely, perhaps, but in the broadest possible sense, to include political, national, industrial systems, also), is that it becomes exceptionally difficult to gather "hard" data or to make "hard" observations. In order that a datum or observation be HARD, in the generally accepted sense, implies that the observation must be repeatable under numerous different conditions, of space, moment, for example, but especially, of USE. In a social context, this requirement has, at most, been marginally satisfied, in the main cases, such as those of psychotherapy, of education, of social helping and of societal planing, hardly at all. The problem of invariance under use is the core problem faced by the OOC/CICT/programme, University of Amsterdam. Here, it is regarded as the most important problem addressed by all present day work in the social and psychological sciences. Several approaches are being developed, in a wide range of research projects, empirical, interventional and theoretical. It was in this context that Gerard de Zeeuw XE "Gerard de Zeeuw"  asked me, nay virtually demanded, that I should help by developing an already existing theory, (Conversation Theory XE "Conversation Theory"  and Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , (DanieI,J..S,1975,Entwistle,N,1978,Pask.G.1961-1992a-to-y Pask, et al,a-to-f) due to my colleagues and myself, already a locally useful theory, if applied in education, decision making XE "decision making" , design and the like) into something able to tackle the much wider issues of societal, organizational, national and international significance. The foundations of this enterprise have already been laid, they are sketched out in this first, monographic volume. They will be greatly amplified, greatly refined and variously discussed in the other, promised, volumes of this series. As the name of the first theory indicates, it stresses the conversational nature of use and of knowledge, more precisely of coming to know XE "coming to know"  both "something" and "one and another", of variance and invariance. It is thus believed capable of encompassing many of the problems considered by the projects in hand and those, many more, seen upon the horizon. Its elaboration, evolution XE "evolution" , reincarnation and development, both contemplated and in progress is titled, for fairly clear reasons, "Interactions of Actors Theory". Just as Conversation Theory XE "Conversation Theory"  is often known as C.T XE "C.T" ., a similar abbreviation is adopted for the novel theory, it is abbreviated to "I.A", XE "I.A"  as an amiable inversion of "A. I. XE "I.A." ", since both make use, copious use, of computers but, generally, in quite distinct situations and different manners. From time-to-time people express surprise at the diversity, even the disparity, of the projects in the OOC/CICT/University of Amsterdam research programme. They do so politely, of course, as befits academia, but are manifestly puzzled, as though we had rabbits in our hats, like conjurers, or maybe trick-cards up our sleeves. I confess that this reaction surprises me (Pask) and, so I imagine my co-author in this series, (de Zeeuw). So far as I am concerned, the programme is entirely coherent XE "coherent" , that is, it forms a unity with sufficient difference XE "difference" , variety XE "variety"  if you prefer it, between researchers, methods and aims to avoid the damning fate of uniformity. By that means it sustains its impetus, of making and improving social support XE "support"  systems, often with computational tools as an asset, also its evolution XE "evolution"  as a viable entity. For all that, it cannot be denied that some people, in some contexts, do not grasp the coherence which seems so blatantly obvious to the participants XE "participants" . Perhaps, one lesson to be learned is that you MUST participate and that if you do participate, then you ARE responsible. It also appears that one, possibly fundamental reason, why some people do not see the coherence of our programme, is a prevalent but fixed idea of "hard data XE "hard data" ". The fixed idea is that of "external observers XE "observers" ", simply typed, in a familiar and so- called, "objective manner", and this idea, with all of its over-simplifications and sheer absurdities, furnishes ALL the "hard data" so that it is ALWAYS "objective data" or, if imported into the context of human and social affairs, the numerical measurement of places or of response latencies or whatever, veering to ever increasing refinement. With some outstanding exceptions, such as the determination of receiver operating curves, short, incisive perceptual experiments, even much of ergonomics, for example, this attempt to harden human and social data objectively (that is, as an outside, impartial observer, taking the subject or society as "it referenced") is bound to fail, if only because it leads, even in terms of classical observation, to a reductio-ad-absurdum, of one kind or another. More importantly, the attempt fails because the hard data XE "hard data"  sought after are "subjectively hard XE "subjectively hard" " and are to be discovered within a different epistemological frame where observation necessarily entails participation, in and as part of, the observed system XE "system" . For instance, a Piagetian interviewer, interacting with a child, often aided by building bricks or LOGO and a turtle (the invention of Feurtzig and Pappert), used, for instance, by Howe and others,(versions from 1973) is one special case. A depth interview,(of the type carried out by Braaten,S,1978, with people or groups of them), is yet another one. That sort of evidence is deemed acceptable, perhaps grudgingly, in the nowadays prevailing intellectual climate, and I can see no reason to reject it, nor ever could do. But to the scientific establishment of the middle 1960's and the early 1970's it was far from palatable, at best dubbed "merely clinical" and, often enough, "apocryphal drivel", or some similar derogatory title. In those days, when we did establish in the frame of C.T XE "C.T" ., at least, the existence of hard valued psycho-social-subjective data, as hard as the data of physics XE "physics" , though of a distinctive kind, we had to employ all manner of electromechanical, later computer XE "computer"  regulated, interfaces in order to show the existence of such stuff as agreements, agreements to disagree but know why, of understandings-that incorporate having come to know, to know how to do and to know why you came to know, in that way. It would be inappropriate to burden the reader with the details of it all, at this juncture or in this volume of our joint series, especially since there are numerous more-or-less detailed and long since published accounts, amongst them the books and papers by Daniel, Entwistle, Pask(1961-1992) and Pask et al, (1965-1992), already noted. These comments appear, superficially, as strictures from a lunatic nursery school teacher; they are not so intended. Rather, they are an appeal to a reader that he or she join in the interaction XE "interaction"  needed to bring a still developing programme of ideas, experiments, praxis, test and test of usefulness to fruition., to agree or agree to disagree and know why, to our mutual enlightenment. But I take the liberty of inserting some photomontages of the plethora of equipment and the years of painstaking experiment, needed to establish the reality of psycho-social-subjective hard data XE "hard data" , (Chapter l. Plate .1. and Plate. 2.), which is one essential constituent of the enterprise. When we speak of data, we mean hard data of this kind. A further reason why confusion may exist is the varied use of the term "information XE "information" " all variants being invoked, from time-to-time. The best discussion of the well known combinatorial form of Ashby, R,(1956), of Gabor and McKay's "Logon and Metron" theory and Shannon's statistical XE "statistical"  information is still to be found in Cherry .C, (1957). However, one less common usage is that of Carl am Petri XE "Petri" , and it is primarily this which we intend, when equating the quantity of awareness or of consciousness XE "consciousness"  to a Petri type of information transfer, the exchange relation of physics XE "physics" . Another common reason why people do not see the inherent coherence of the programme is its apparent lack of integration, or orchestration. They could probably be persuaded otherwise by appeal to reason, or the factuality of improvements, or by a demonstrable ability to muster localised resources. It would, however, be far better to invite whoever may be in doubt to enter the front door, to participate in the interaction XE "interaction"  which leads to the growth of this programme of research and to partake in its evolution XE "evolution"  . By so participating, agreeing or agreeing to disagree over the resolution of causes for disquiet, their possibly justifiable critiques might, very likely. be converted into positive contributions to buttress, maybe in novel and quite unexpected ways, the resolution of what everyone takes to be distressing situations. All of these capabilities and possibilities call for a human interface, like the Piagetian interviewer, or a mechanical interface, like CASTE XE "CASTE"  or THOUGHTSTICKER XE "THOUGHTSTICKER" , (Plate. 1. and Plate .2.), it is informative to estimate its necessary magnitude. Some kind of quantitative comparison, albeit approximate, is more readily examined in terms of the mechanical alternative, in terms of what, necessarily, is needed to capture the interactions, conversational or not, between the actors XE "actors"  involved, further, to do so realistically. The job can be fudged, of course, by using virtual-realities, various hyper-media, and so on, to render the otherwise incomprehensible clear. These devices are very impressive and valuable and should be employed rather than derided. Further, their implementations require, in professional form, only about 10 megabytes of RAM and 50 megabytes of hard disc storage, together with a few background processors or an itty-biity connectionist machine to act as a competent interface. But, taken alone, they ARE fudges, that only, however valuable. For the main interfaces between people and societies, are systems using, in one technique, virtual machines XE "machines"  as surrogates for elaborate numbers, vectors, matrices and so on, often non-linear, for computation XE "computation"  and used as the basic substratum. In this idiom, other machines, acting upon them, that are productive XE "productive"  and, incidentally reproductive XE "reproductive" , machines, and, being virtual machines in their own right, serve well as the computational elements. This is only one method of achieving the concurrency required of a genuinely evolving interface system XE "system" . But it is a useful exemplar, since it is necessary, still using the multimodal- hype rmedia interfaces, to multiply the 10 megabyte and 50 megabyte figures suggested, by about 100 and, as a result of doing so, intelligently, their efficacy is increased by about 2500, or more. It is possible to justify these rough-and-ready numerical comparisons, far from the best and amongst the more conservative, but it would detract from the main line or argument, to do so, at this point. That is particularly so, because a cartload of technical systems, interfaces or not, mingled with a few interesting ideas and results, are scarcely enough to convince those skeptics, who do not see the coherence of our programme, the OOC/CICT/Univsiteit Amsterdam, of the fact that it IS, coherent XE "coherent" . This, perhaps, is why Gerard de Sew XE "Gerard de Zeeuw"  asked me to start XE "start"  and to mount a convincing argument, distinct from his own, (for example, Zeeuw, G. de1985 or Zeeuw, G. de 1990), with which I am in accord, in this FIRST volume of our series and to assist in the preparation of other VOLUMES in that series, presaged by de Zeeuw, G. and Pask G., complied by Glanville R.,(1992). Finally, the development of a rather specialised theory, namely, I.A. Theory, has given rise to a number of useful by-products XE "products" . Some of these have a wider-scope, beyond the expected compass of I.A. XE "I.A."  and some features, having applications that are virtually universal XE "universal" . The enterprise was not contrived for this purpose, but the outcomes, detailed in Chapter l. do not altogether surprise either de Zeeuw or myself. In essence, the outcomes concerned are (a). That as the development of I.A. XE "I.A."  theory went on and still goes on, the more its FORM approaches the FORM of a well kiltered scientific theory, (having, for example, principles of conservation XE "conservation" , of symmetry, of complementarity XE "complementarity" , of duality XE "duality" , parity XE "parity" , exclusion XE "exclusion" , indeterminacy XE "indeterminacy" , essential singularities XE "singularities"  ), and alternative interpretations, (such as the fact that quark XE "quark" -gluon  XE "gluon " -plasmas XE "plasmas"  are isomophic or nearly so to the notions associated with strings XE "strings"  and superstrings XE "superstrings"  ). Of course, the content is different, (which is not to say that the contents will never converge), since we deal with hard subjective data XE "hard subjective data"  and physics XE "physics" , for instance, operates within a distinct epistemic frame, affirming its conclusions by hard objective data albeit emerging, as the content of Bunge's (Bunge. M. ,1967), "Scientific Knowledge" from the multilemmas and problems of the "Common Knowledge", which primarily concerns us. (b). This point is aptly phrased by Stephen Hawkins in his most recent book, (Hawkins,1992), when he distinguishes between a universal XE "universal"  theory, on the one hand, and its enlivenment by understanding XE "understanding" , on the other. The commonality asserted makes sense, since I.A. XE "I.A."  is chiefly a theory of understanding, especially your understanding of me, mine of you, both of us, our shared understanding of those universes in which we live and have our being. But it is only so by virtue of a participation, which promotes evolution XE "evolution" . Our thesis is so general, but also so rigorous, that it might be expected to have a pervasive influence upon many, so called-disciplines, or areas of study. PLATE.1. PLATE.2., IN HERE CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES This monograph stands, in its own right, as a book. But it is more profitably regarded as the prologue to a series of books, by Gerard de Zeeuw XE "Gerard de Zeeuw"  and myself, as Volume 1 of that series. All of these volumes are concerned with concepts XE "concepts"  of organizations, systems of belief, cultures XE "cultures"  and civilisations; concisely, about andragology XE "andragology" , if you accept the Dutch meaning XE "meaning"  of the word; that of enquiry and intervention research into society, support XE "support"  systems in or between cultures, of their concrete manifestations, be they architectural or intended for transportation of people, goods or data or relying upon computational artefacts, needed to maintain the precious jewels of civilised life. I have subtitled this book a monograph, since I accept responsibility XE "responsibility" , alone, for its idiosyncrasies and dogmas. But, insofar as these dogmas prove to be effective, even salient, then it may, more properly, be titled, volume 1; of a series written by Gerard de Zeeuw XE "Gerard de Zeeuw" , by myself, colleagues and friends. In that respect, this volume 1, my preferred entitulation, is a terse, in places historical and in other places arid and formal prerequisite for scrutiny of the other volumes in a series, which is an evolved but, thankfully, still evolving endeavour, and long may it remain that way. In large measure, though not exclusively, it is focused upon the work of those at, or passing through, the OOC/CICT/ University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, also those at, or having passed through the Architectural Association School of Architecture, London, U.K. 1.1 SPECIFICATION OF THE FIELD The idiosyncrasy brought to bear upon this first volume (my responsibility XE "responsibility" , but, it seems, a point of view compatible with the views of many colleagues), is this. Andragology XE "Andragology" , in common with REAL architecture XE "architecture" , that of HABITATION in a society, the civilisation of a culture XE "cultures" , is comparable to if not identical with the Cybernetics XE "Cybernetics"  of inter-personal and intra-personal interaction XE "interaction" , of society and its organization, usually entailing media, computation XE "computation" , mechanistic devices and the like. It is biased towards, primarily focused upon, such matters as pedagogy, education, lifelong learning, creativity, self regulation and evolutionary XE "evolution"  self-organization XE "self-organisation"  of human and societal systems, politics, commerce and industry, albeit catalysed or promoted by often-mechanical inventions. Yet, insofar as the theoretical constructs needed and the conclusions reached in this sensibly wide domain, of andragology XE "andragology" , architecture and Cybernetics are utterly general, these domains are interleaved with many others. Quite frequently, these others are not human-in-themselves, even if they are forged, in some biological or physical Smithy, by Smiths with human ingenuity. If they are general, as asserted and believed to be, then so they should be and the underlying principles, not so often the data, should have the form and symmetry of a science XE "science" . Consequently, one centroid id of this enterprise (there are many centroids, such as the alleviation of sufferinq, the catalysis of emerging support XE "support"  systems, the solution of problems and the resolution of problematic situations, the creation and sustenance of langua ages, be they verbal. visual, behavioural or whatever which form essential ingredients of such endeavours) is, as follows. To demonstrate unequivocally that those fields often alluded to as SOFT sciences XE "soft sciences" , or SLOPPY sciences, are neither soft nor sloppy. A convincing argument for this aspect of the enterprise (as above, not the only aspect), calls for a radical reinterpretation of many attempts to render studies or interventions respectable, by placing the sheep's clothing of statistics, in one form or another, over a body of so-called-factual data which is, on the whole, neither data nor factual. This, obviously, recalls the "subjectively hard XE "subjectively hard" " and, (in this context, "objectively hard XE "objectively hard" " data, noted in the Introduction). Frequently, one is not the other, whatever the ticks and crosses distribution. May we, once again, emphasise that OUR "hard data XE "hard data" " is seldom "objectively hard" data. As an apologia, objectively hard data is legitimate, if obtainable, but is still based upon the bounding perimeters determined by "subjectively hard", if only as a method of supporting the validity of hypotheses and tests, formulated notions of "agreement XE "agreement" " and "agreement to disagree XE "agreement to disagree" ", all subjective and hard, so far as reasonable implicating the interested populace, the body politic, but logically prior to the posing and testing of objective hypotheses. As a point of common sense, the hardness of data, be it molecular and nmr spectra, be it understandings in a conversation XE "conversation" , is dependent upon its us usefulness and use It is useful just insofar a it can be knit together into a jersey or a framework, be it tangible and it referenced and objective or a conceptual framework, like a theory or a body of knowledge, signifying nothing of necessity except coming to know XE "coming to know" . But that, of course, signifies a lot. Here, for example, I allude to statistical XE "statistical"  methods applied to the ticks and crosses of questionnaire type interviewers and pollsters. Whereas the opinions of the test administrators about those questioned may have great significance, the ticks and crosses they are instructed to record are, for the most part, aleatory. Now, in REAL statistics,we are required to justify the validity of the data underlying the counts we submit to the elegant mathematical XE "mathematical"  techniques of statistics, checking such matters as the independence of evidence, the ultimately reducible-to-dyadic form of relations XE "relations"  and so on. THESE crucial steps are, not infrequently, omitted. The fact is that standard statistics takes these judgement for granted, it can apply, in the abstract, to anything having the well specified properties it demands of data. In reality, we are the beings responsible for the exercise of this methodology, and the propriety of the data involved. For example, if monkeys are playing with a typewriter and someone counts the number of keys they press and calls that number the data, so let it be. Well, if those kinds of observations really are data, then it is possible to garner interesting results, mostly that there is no correlation between the data obtained over a myriad trials with a legion of monkeys. Or, if there is some correlation, or an interesting analysis of variance, then it shows something about who manufactured the typewriter and how battered it became, as a result of being thrown upon the floor, in natural irritation, by the creatures. It rarely reveals anything, by way of a conclusion, about the intellect of monkeys, which the experimenter is primarily concerned with Seldom are such misperceptions deliberately fraudulent, they are understandably careless, but nevertheless damaging, consequences of an unthought-out-attempt to make a study of monkeys, or people, look scientific and respectable by applying methods which would be elegant and applicable to appropriate facts, counts, and so on of evidence if it DID have the kinds of factuality required by the scientific method or by the statistical XE "statistical"  method XE "statistics" . In this context it is important to stress that there are several uses of the term " probability", each involving some notion of "likelihood". One of them, the one open to criticism as often misused, refers to the "chance" of something-or-other, for example of a dice falling on one or other face. The other, immediately significant, usage, employed in quantum mechanics or, for that matter, in our discussion of resonant forms of analogy XE "analogy"  in Chapter5., is a "disposition" of some event to take place. The latter is, frequently, immune to the criticisms which have just been leveled against the former. Next, it is important to examine the urge to respectabilise most experimental studies or socio-technical-interventions as BEING scientific. Perhaps it is a matter of aesthetics, for scientific and mathematical XE "mathematical"  arguments are undoubtedly beautiful and reveal symmetries of great power and subtlety. Also, of course, there is a less laudable rationalisation; that you are prone to be funded by the establishment if you are regarded as scientific; provided, of course, that science XE "science"  is misconstrued as some sort of technology, the hodmanlike XE "hodman"  variety XE "variety" , which almost guarantees a product within one, or a couple of years, at most. Personally, I subscribe to a somewhat different view, namely, that there is not an iota of fundamental difference XE "difference"  between -art., philosophv XE "philosophv"  and science XE "science"  provided they are all conducted with an appropriate degree of delicacy and integrity. As such, these studies are unlikely to produce scores, at any rate numerical and properly statisticised scores, within a readily predictable interval and there is the risk that an honest investigator will opine that numerically quantified results are not the appropriate findings to search for, at any rate, not the most informative. After all, qualitative findings of equal or greater rigour do, very often, have greater value, unless the sponsor of the research is after Brownie Points, obtained by presenting tables of figures which may be cast into the garbage bin, or else discretely shredded. Clearly, the attitude I have just outlined and countered by a parody, would have been generally regarded as curious a few decades past. The opposite view, still calls for defence, even though, in this year and age, it is becoming increasingly pervasive. Of course, the day to day activities of an artist, fiddling with brushes or musical instruments or dance steps; of philosophers, debating language or the character of the cosmos, reality, mind and all that; of scientists preoccupied with particle accelerators, test tubes, chemicals, Wimshurst machines XE "machines"  and so on DO differ, but, also, ARE very similar. To me, maybe it is a matter of personal experience, combined with preference for the eclectic. The similarities are more salient than the evident differences XE "differences" . It is not, perhaps, so surprising that the similarities are prone to stand out more obviously in the domain of intra-personal and inter-personal systems, of social systems and cultures, of organizations and systems of belief, of mind, thought, action XE "action" , the interaction XE "interaction"  of actors XE "actors" , in general, and in conversational interaction between various participants XE "participants" . The points which, most likely, require stressing are, apart from some perfectly clear differences in technique, like paint and musical scales and drama method, compared to chemicals, test tubes, cellular culture XE "cultures"  dishes and so on, are as follows (a).All of them can be formalised, further, formalisation is fruitful. Under certain conditions. In this respect choreology, 7 tone scales and the like, can be invoked, as may Lie groups XE "Lie groups" , or Algebraic Topologies, or Category theories, with roughly equal rigour and their invocation justified, insofar as this degree of rigour is of value. (b).Rigour XE "Rigour"  tends to have great value when discursive expression would be unduly ambiguous XE "ambiguous" , turgid or tedious to handle in recording, so that a symbolic formalism is practicably essential. (c). Formalism, let it be stressed, is not restricted to quantitative solutions, qualitative solutions being of equal propriety and often greater profit. It is entirely legitimate to use methodologies, formalisations as a support XE "support"  for many types of rigour. Numerical, quantitative, rigour has its appropriate place in this spectrum, but is often of local usefulness. (d).Art, philosophy, science XE "science"  and the rest are bound to coexist, if any of them have genuine meaning XE "meaning" . Upon even casual scrutiny, it would be impossible to understand one without comprehension of the others. To cite but one familiar exemplar from mathematics XE "mathematics"  and science, how else could most people understand the indefinite iteration of non-linear equations, in the complex plane, unless assisted by artistry such as that of Peitgen et al (Pietgen et al, 1991).? They could, of course, parrot out strings XE "strings"  of meaningless symbols and perform specific operations, prescribed by a rule book, upon them. That kind of rote repetition is sheer twaddle, not mathematics. (e).Very likely, art, philosophy and science XE "science"  DO have the character of programmes of research, in the sense of Imre Lakatos,(Lakatos.l.,1968), or constitute what we shall call P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals" , with Organizational Closure XE "Organisational Closure"  and, if viable, the Informational Openness XE "Informational Openness" , originated by the self-organization XE "self-organisation"  of Heinz Von Foerster XE "Heinz Von Foerster"  (Von Foerster.H.,1959.a.) However, in the often vaunted disciplines, called by the high sounding names of history, or biology, as used in a curriculum, syllabus or department title and that are imposed as arbitrary distinctions XE "distinctions" , in order to fund the presiding hierarchy, high or low; rather than to encourage the intended activity in question these disciplines are the merest piffle. Page 12 Missing Case when psycho-social-educational systems are concerned. The greater part of their data, being of a strong SUBJECTIVE rather than of a strong OBJECTIVE kind, are surely not amenable to these elegant techniques. They are not, even on mathematical XE "mathematical"  grounds, to do with irreducible adicity, (Atkin,1973,1975), let alone that the facts of value are obtained by dint of PARTICIPATION XE "participation" , impartial, maybe, rather than some EXTERNAL type of observation, disconnected and controlled, which, by definition, minimally influences the observed system XE "system" . There is nothing misbegotten about one kind of data or the other, but it is positively stupid to maintain their identity, deliberately or not. It is misleading to dress them up like dummies, so that they seem to be the same. That is the genesis of fake science XE "science" , just as an ink splodge in a Rorschach Test might be misconstrued as a piece of modern art. It is particularly irresponsible and irritating when some investigators indulge in a habit which some others fall for, of using the paraphernalia of science proper, statistical XE "statistical"  methods culled from gaming saloons as one instance, independence of observations as another instance (there are many more of them), in order to respectabilise, as scientific, whatever it is, merely because it is cheap and simple to do. For example, the elicitation of George Kelly-like-personal constructs, in psychology of one-or-other kind, as is done by Sheila Augenstein and Laurie Thomas (in Thomas and Augenstein 1992), is entirely defensible (even if I admit to some very minor quibbles over their methodology). On the other hand, it may or may not be valid to employ the factor analyses of Osgood's scaling (Osgood..C.E,et a1,1976), or, in a different context, Eysenck's factor analytic and often multidimensional but Cartesian scaling, Eysenck.F,1968,), which demands obedience to various caveats and is liable to be misleading, unless cases are critically examined. In some cases, no doubt, these elaborate statistical XE "statistical"  techniques and the assumptions underlying them, make good sense, in others less good sense. In either case, an outright acceptance of whatever results are obtained, lacking an appreciation of the methods and the assumptions involved, is a bad, sad, parody of reason, especially if it is taken to justify certain findings as scientific and, thus, respectable. This kind of thinking is also culpable, insofar as it leads others to conclude that there is a sacrosanct method called the scientific method, just one such method. Indubitably, there is a scientific method and it is very elegant, employed with the proper type of evidence. But the elegant is defaced, becomes nauseating and ugly, if misused in order to ape, with gestures, grunts and grimaces the respectable character of otherwise untenable findings or displays. Upon the next point, that of predictability, it is often claimed that every bit of research should lead to predictable results. Clearly, there is some sense in this contention, but limited sense. Suppose, for example, that you are in charge of a production XE "production"  line with operatives doing repetitious jobs, be they manual or clerical (like the check out juniors, at a Supermarket). In that case, it is very likely that various psychometric tests will predict, quite reliably, the willingness of people to act like automata, even to predict their intelligence (not their intellect), that is, how bright an automaton you are likely to obtain. Roughly speaking, these comments apply to those folk who are employed in linear and hierarchically ordered jobs, of the kind that are susceptible to Elliott Jaques's time span analysis (Jaques.E, 1970), where a great deal of meaning XE "meaning"  can be attached to the preferred time of unsupervised, no feedback, activity. In a linear-hierarchical setting. Here, it is sensible to say that a measure such as the one proposed by Jaques, usually indicates the maximum extent to which potential employees are anxious to accept personal responsibility XE "responsibility" , indirectly, in such a context, the remuneration they deserve and usually expect. But, thank heaven, such occupational settings are relatively scarce and are, thankfully, less often encountered. More and-more organizations are becoming, at least, heterarchically structured XE "heterarchically structured" . Humans are being used, as Norbert Wiener XE "Wiener"  put it, for human purposes, (Weiner.N, 1965,), rather than as inefficient robots. Now, in a situation of the latter kind, what does it mean to predict? Further, if you are a manager of the latter sort of situation, do you want to predict? Consider one extreme case, there are plenty of other less dramatic exemplars. Suppose that you have a firm, an organization of any sort, and that this firm or organization needs to improve or diversify its products XE "products" . For one reason or another, because you run the firm or are assigned decision making XE "decision making"  responsibility XE "responsibility" , you are required to employ someone with inventive talent. It might be sensible to look for someone capable of invention, they have demonstrated their capability by inventing, preferably having the perseverance needed to bring their invention to fruition through a nexus of production XE "production"  engineers and an inherently conservative bureaucracy, a process XE "process"  requiring tact and also a degree of determination. But to this extent ONLY, do you seek predictability since, by definition of the job, you do not wish to predict their innovations. If you could, you or one of your colleagues, would have done so, by measure of their own intuitions. Now the inventor you elect to engage, is not predictable. If he were, you would not really want to employ this person, for there are many whom you do not wish to employ, who will, in their lifespan, have but one invention to their credit, the one you reasonably use as a guideline in selection. Much the same applies, also, to the criterion of repeatability. Do you wish that, under the same or similar circumstances, someone who will give the same response to a superficially similar question, or the same kind of solution to a superficially similar problem?? If you are seeking an elaborate kind of robot, then, maybe, you do. But if you are after a sentient being, flushed out with intellect, then you do NOT. Supposing you are this hypothetical manager, what DO you want. Equisignificantly, supposing that you are a researcher, one in the enormously wide field of concern, addressed by this book and the series of books to come, just what DO you want? I submit, and this IS a slightly Maverick point of view, that you want, nay require, an utterly devoted enthusiast, having a different since all embracing perspective upon art, philosophy, science XE "science"  and the rest. Further, pardon the dogmatism, you NEED it. In this preliminary book, I shall attempt to delineate such a person or, more likely, group. That material is, largely, embedded in the formal part of this monograph. It is, of necessity, introduced by some historical account, showing when, how, and why such a perspective was envisioned. It is gratifying that the development of this one perspective gave rise to a formalism which, as it evolved, more-andmore assumed the form, not so much the content as the beautiful symmetries of a scientific theory. Finally, since this monograph is a book which introduces a series of books, it is reasonable, if not mandatory, to provide a tentative overview, tentative since it treats of an evolution XE "evolution" . 1.3. ESSENCE OF CURRENT STUDIES The essential theme of our current studies, needs, if only as a matter of convenience, to have a name. It has been called Interaction of Actors theory, or merely I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, as a humorous but friendly juxtaposition with Artificial Intelligence XE "Artificial Intelligence" , or A.I. theory, which it is not, even though they both make prolific but quite different use of computers in their practice. Their practice, of course, that and their methodology, also have a part to play in the theatre of this exposition. Before embarking upon the promised, historical account, of what we may now condense to I.A. XE "I.A." , it is prudent to spend a few words upon the nature of history itself. That is so, if only because the nature of history, perhaps an outlandish view of it, is one and an important ingredient of the theory and praxis to be scrutinised. Yes, a quite essential one in the outer reaches of the territory we cover of sheer, even if embarrassing, necessity. 1.4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL To speak of history, any history, as though there was but one somehow canonical history, diligently researched and meticulously carbon dated, for example, is misleading. Such an utterance may be imaged by one of the idols, in the temple of conventional wisdom. But, usually, also, these utterances are segments of respectabilised blether. The following assertion, that any entity, culture XE "cultures"  or civilisation, for instance, carries innumerable, in some ways differing, histories, is a deviant, possibly arrogant, assertion, but it is made, at this point, with all consideration and seriousness. 1.5. UNAVOIDABILITY OF MULTIPLE HISTORIES XE "MULTIPLE HISTORIES"  This multitude of histories exists, for several reasons. In the present context, it is appropriate to dwell upon a pair of them, only. First of all, there is a deeply entrenched idea, buttressed by the majority of text books, that history is JUST chronological, a matter of recording and recalling which King, Queen or President reigned or ruled when and where. Now, if we subscribe to this view (which is by no means useless), we are bound, in all honesty, to consider the uniformity or not of temporal XE "temporal"  succession. Is time the same commodity in South America, in China, in India, Africa, Greece, in Italy, in the rest of Europe, in Bali and Surinam (further, has it always been so). No one, physicists and geneticists apart, seems to question the possibility that time is not uniform throughout these domains or during these very different periods. Well, I do, not because I disagree with or even contest, its validity and manifest convenience, but simply because I can see little other than-limited experiential evidence in favour of this elegant but possibly over-rated, even if undeniably-useful, hypothesis. In contrast, we can imagine history as a systematic enactment of how people, Kings and Potentates included, conceptualise, feel, think and act; of how societies do the same; if you like, the study of a reenactment, an enactment of aeons-to-be; of futures. Or if temporal XE "temporal"  succession is occasionally tied into knots explicating how these activities recur, then you may be immersed in a wonderment over how there is history at all. Just consider, for a moment, the days of Druids, of Roman Britain, of Nordic York or Norman York, the age of the Stuarts and their Masques, of the London Mob, or, after the Peelers came along, of stage coaches and the railways, the resurgence of the early Victorian from the sombre shades of the next half generation into the gay but evanescent Edwardian. These juxtaposed points of view upon history are complementary, not contradictory. They have and should have the quality of life, surely supported by chronological tables, as right as a table can be. I am stressing these matters and differences XE "differences" , if only because they become outstandingly significant in delineating a history of I.A. XE "I.A." , theory and practice and method. Here, I know, from personal although necessarily limited experience, that there are many different histories. I shall essay to indicate a few, some of greater value to some people, some of greater value to other people. None of them are canonical, but all of them are valid and, in their own way, by comparison and contrast, very illuminating. More dramatically, since it explicitly invokes evolution XE "evolution" , compare and contrast the hoary, doubtless veridical chronology most often passed around. There were animals, some became people, some people formed nomadic hunting groups, others, of less peripatetic inclination, settled down as agricultural groups; both formed cultures with languages, however of different kinds. The former were satisfied by sign signification, the latter formed cultures having a fixed territory in which they built houses and cities; these, being inhabited as well as protective, gave rise to civilisation with symbolic value attached to the territory and the artifacts they erected. But, conversely, how could animals have been people unless they had a mind containing a germinating seed of people, culture XE "cultures"  and civilisation, the logical priority?? As a curtain call, if there be one, after the first scene it is seemly to present the arguments of Collingwood.R.G,(1990) and Collingwood.R.G,(1990), Oxford University Press. CHAPTER 2. I.A. XE "I.A."  HISTORY IN OUTLINE One history, a perfectly valid one, is that I.A. XE "I.A."  came into being as an innovative extension of conversation XE "conversation"  theory (henceforward, C.T XE "C.T" .) and its proto-language or proto-logic (henceforward, Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" ). This development was, in large measure, due to the invaluable help and provocation provided by Gerard de Zeeuw XE "Gerard de Zeeuw" , in respect to social support XE "support"  systems, with a bias (emerging more clearly in a later book), to the field of engineering management (instigated by Larry Richards), for academic precision, see, for example, Richards.L, (1992). In the role of a rational being, it is my task to say what C.T XE "C.T" . and Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  are. Given the added role of historian, to say how C.T., Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , also I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, emerged. The latter role is a difficult part to play, even to write for reasons which the reader may well have culled from the lengthy preamble upon history, exposed in the last chapter. It is so, even though I am possibly the first and main protagonist of conversation XE "conversation"  theory and have as much personal experience as anyone of its origins. So far as chronology is concerned, it is easy enough to cite manifestos and research programme outlines, dating from the very late 1960s and the early 1970s, with the names Conversation Theory XE "Conversation Theory"  and Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  (or its slightly misnomered predecessor, entailment mesh XE "mesh" ), printed in bald capital letters. But it is surprising to this author, at any rate, to discover, afresh, one's own papers or one's own articles (for example, in Dialectica, pp. 167.-pp. 202, Vol. 2, Vol. 3, Neuchatel, 1963, "The use of analogy XE "analogy"  and parable in Cybernetics XE "Cybernetics" , with emphasis upon learning and creativity", or, in Wiener XE "Wiener"  and Schade, Eds, Progress in BioCybernetics, Elsevier, 1966, pp. 158.-p250, " The Cybernetics of Social and of Ethical systems". There are many more, pre-dating and post-dating these papers, which entail the IDEA, of, although rarely the NAME of conversation XE "conversation" . It should be evident that history is not a neat and linear chronology, even to its participants XE "participants" . Similarly, let me state that none of these notions, initially of making bizarre chemical and biological machines XE "machines" , able to compute, in order to philosophically demonstrate the sheer, asinine, fatuity of supposing there to be any input or output apart from those determined, as a matter of convenience, by some external observer, to an assembly of fabric called a computer XE "computer"  or controller. Such assemblages arose, together with clouds of nitrogen peroxide, from other-than-laboratory studies, excepting those in our basement, kitchen, or a lock-up-garage. Similarly, the most telling demonstrations of interaction XE "interaction" , albeit human interaction through machinery, hybrid but less bizarre, arose from the worlds of cabaret, of music hall, of theatre and the like, where, under the stress imposed by the pressing necessity of putting on a show, if only to earn a living, my colleagues and I came to realise that it IS possible to couple people together with multiple mode oscillators, responsive to and regulating music, performers, lights and motions, provided that the people are participants XE "participants" , as they were at Churchills Club and the Streatham Locarno. There is NO reward or punishment, neither explicitly nor observably.(for an historical summary see Pask.G., in Reichardt.J., Ed,1971). At that juncture, knowing it all worked in the deep end of the swimming bath, we ventured into the paddling pool of the experimental laboratory, first in the context of interactive and adaptive human machine systems for training, vigilance control, work loading and the like, later into systems for human groups and adaptive machinery through which the groups could interact. In those days we could not afford computers, and they were tetchy things anyhow. The machinery we did employ was, even so, much more sophisticated even if slower and less reliable, for certain, than most of the piffling, pardon the term, highly vaunted technological wonders of today. Only very recently has it been possible to observe the emergence of something more imaginative and better, it is encouraging to see it being developed and downright outrageous to hear costeffectively-minded loons suggest that it might be a good idea to simplify and disseminate some picayune systems in order to show the populace the ideas of computer XE "computer"  assisted indoctrination. No, absolutely adorable Kelly girls, hired as consultants, by an office near to Victoria Station, circa 1990, it would NOT, even if you DID have the remotest idea about what you were talking so glibly. It would dissuade them, again, of the teaching machine fallacies of the late 1950s, possibly increasing the recession rate, or whatever economists call it. From all this, it is legitimate to infer that history is a matter of living. Further, it must be apparent that life is neither sequential nor lacking in emotive reaction, hence barren. However, there are certain points at which organizations form. Many of them being institutes and laboratories. They naturally apply constraints to those participating in them, System Research, of Richmond, Surrey, the B.C.L., of Illinois, Brunel University and so on. Now, I speak of those contexts but confess that none of them were so well ordered as they may, superficially, appear to be. Regarding C.T XE "C.T" ., it became evident that people, groups of them and small societies, do not work by the in-those-days presumed method of emitting and receiving stimuli, emitting and being receptive to responses, or manipulating reinforcements or determining the regularity of operants, one way of patching up complete lack of motive. Whilst, within special and useful limits, folk might interact with an adaptive machine and be trained by it, outside these limits, any inbuilt distinction XE "distinction"  between trainer and learner became hopelessly blurred. The people or groups of people taught the machine, just as much as it taught them, they co-learned and the neat and tidy black-box boundaries simply evaporated as the result of an activity which can only be called play, in Huizinga's sense, of children's play, in a street (Huzinga.J, 1949). To phrase it differently, they became, in part, as one. That is, these people or groups of people, simply conversed with each other. There is a big difference XE "difference" , which has to be respected. If speaking as a strict behaviourist, then I should be bound to believe that the more accurately I control the conditions of a black box: called the subject and another black box called the, possibly mechanical, environment the more, precisely may I make sensible observations of the stimuli/responses or inputs/outputs, the more readily, given luck and perspicuity, is it possible to infer the mechanisms, otherwise hidden, by fiat, inside the opaque boundaries of the black boxes of subject and of environment. Or, taken to a different level of liberalisation, the more accurately I may construct some normal-form-model XE "model" , say a computer XE "computer"  program, beloved of artificial intelligence, which simulates what the black boxes do. If, however, I am neither a strict behaviourist nor a strict cognitive scientist, then it is permissible to propose that both of them, behavioural and cognitive-without-conation, have grasped wrongly chosen branches of a tree's twig and could, more fruitfully have acknowledged that elaborations of their data will lead them nowhere, excepting into confusion, of increasing intensity. The stem of that twig leads to the living tree, from which it was snatched and dried out as a static, impoverished, specimen in a fossilised arboretum. For all their pretensions, that is what these specimens are and I doubt if anyone wanted to collect such things, apart from the undoubted fact that because they are kinematic XE "kinematic"  frames, rather than the kinesis XE "kinesis"  of life, there lingers a seductive idea that because they are readily slotted into a twig and smaller twig taxonomy, they are easy to classify and deal with, heaven forbid it, to claim to somehow explain. What is an alternative, that is, to the stimulus/response or input/output type of observation, elaborated by all manner of sophisticated model XE "model"  types? I submit that it is a transaction, an interaction XE "interaction" , usually multidirectional, which we choose to call a CONVERSATION XE "CONVERSATION"  between PARTICIPANTS. Emphatically, it is NOT generally, though it MAY be, conducted in written or verbal terms. Equally, the relevant languages, employed by the participants XE "participants"  may be visual, musical, poetic, balletic, behavioural, the sign language of airports or the sign language of railway trains, boats, spacecraft or inter galactic debate and intercourse. It IS, however, a natural language insofar as, crudely or with immense refinement, it can accommodate questions, commands, entreaties, replies, obediences or not, desires, metaphors and allegories designating analogies XE "analogies"  of greater or lesser elaboration. In brief, all such natural languages are founded upon the primitive or proto-language Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , or the primitive or protologic, bearing the same title, of Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , whereby its expressions may be manipulated. What is a participant XE "participant" , further, what is a conversation XE "conversation" , between participants XE "participants" . It seems to be, but ultimately is not perverse, to insist upon the utmost generality. 2.2. PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR CONVERSATIONS I can participate, so can you, by way of a conversation XE "conversation"  about something, be it riding, driving, walking, rhetoric, a tree, an idea, a belief, a conversation, a shrub, a chair, a dog or cosmology XE "cosmology" , biology and the rest. In doing so we generally ostend, point at, a thing or the name of a thing, event, scheme or whatever, of which we are, in very different ways, aware. In the course of our conversation, we share our own concepts XE "concepts" , your concept XE "concept"  of a tree, say, and my concept of a tree, for that matter of anything, any event, or so on. For brevity, let us call it T, if you like the target of a conversation, like the targets with a dot surrounded by circles, used by archers, and dartspeople, for practice. An odd and fascinating feature of this conversational activity is that in the conversational process XE "process"  of concept sharing, you and I may learn quite a lot or quite a little about T, in the sense of a philosopher's definition of T, but supposing that our conversation goes on, I learn a great deal about YOUR concept of T and you learn a great deal about MY concept of T. Neither one nor the other of us may have the remotest idea, least of all the philosopher's definitional idea, of a T. In that respect one or both of us may entertain massive misperceptions, for example, you thinking that T is a static unicorn and I thinking that T is a coat and hat stand, the text books insisting that it has leaves and roots and bends in the wind. On the other hand, you, as one participant XE "participant"  (say, A) do learn a great deal about me, the other participant (say, B). That seems to be the main point of a conversation, that one participant, say, A, learns about B, how A differs from and is similar to B, the ostended T acting, primarily, as a pivot. However, this tacit identification of conversational participants XE "participants"  as people, like you and I or A and B, is not entirely satisfactory. It ceases to be veridical even in the laboratory or institute, where it becomes clear that groups and coalitions converse with other groups and coalitions, just as much as people converse with people. In general, we should like participants, such as A and B, to be identified not only with people but societies and cultures XE "cultures"  and nations, with analogous, similar but different, systems of belief lodging in the same brain, with the inhabitants of Mars or some other planet, in some other galaxy, with any other not necessarily biological entities, like pinched plasmas XE "plasmas" , alive but differently fabricated. Further, it is most desirable to have an indefinitely large potential colloquy of A's and B's, say Z XE "Z"  = A, B XE "A, B" , ..... and so on. How to attain this measure of generality remained an unformulated problem, a problem to be formulated over several years. It first appeared in an almost obsessive preoccupation, at the age of about 16 years, as I recall it. So much for the history of straight chronology, carbon dating and so on. My friends and I, my family must have been bored out of their minds with it, knew there was a resolution. One obstacle which stood in the path of attaining the goal of an adequate resolution until 35 years ago, roughly, was the fact that there are innumerable ways of characterising individuals, participants XE "participants"  like A and B. If they are people, it is, for instance, possible to refer to their photographs, their anatomical or physiological boundaries, their psyches, fingerprints and, in context, their personalities. But even within one classification, I can recognise a person by their immune system XE "system" , even part of it, their genetic profile, their scent. Regrettably or not, none of these are canonical in the required sense, though all of them are perfectly legitimate. That is to say, and this turned out to be the essential clue, they are legitimate to an impartial, external, observer. They are not, however, dependent upon the distinctions XE "distinctions"  cloven by an observer. Whilst observer recognised, these beings are self generated, created by the life of some participant XE "participant"  organism him or her self. It matters little whether he or she is a person, or a society, or organization. What is canonical is an invariant, described by Kurt Lewin as genidentity, (Lewin.K, 1922), the fact that you are observed AS YOU and believe you ARE YOU, still, even if you have slept, been anaesthetised, suffered concussion, coma, or been in deep hypnosis. What is the YOU which does have this property, a property which is self creative and which observers XE "observers"  must respect in the relatively arbitrary demarcations they opt to make?? I called it, our group calls it, P- Individuation. meaning XE "meaning"  psycho-social-individuation, sufficiently general to characterise all of the entities so far noted and others to add. It is usefully contrasted with M-Individuation XE "M-Individuation" , or mechanical, including biological as a peculiarly elegant special case of incarnation. 2.3. P-INDIVIDUALS A P-INDIVIDUAL is a PRODUCTIVE XE "PRODUCTIVE"  and, incidentally, a REPRODUCTIVE XE "REPRODUCTIVE"  system XE "system" . It is organizationally-closed XE "organisationally-closed" , informationally-open XE "informationally-open" , and in this case, at least, self organising XE "self organising" . Characteristically, it is specified as follows. There exist productive XE "productive"  operators which MAY be applied to entities belonging to a domain, or substrate, and which, if so applied, yield products XE "products" . AMONGST these products (perhaps after several series of transformations), this iterated activity gives rise to products that are the productive operators, themselves. Although MAY does not imply MUST, there is a principle, governing the system, say a conservation XE "conservation"  principle, such that at some stage, ALL productive operators must be applied and, further, that at ANY stage SOME productive operator MUST be applied to the substrate. It is worthy of notice that these simple specifications yield. reproduction, as a necessity, and that the mandate of AMONGST guarantees the appearance of other products, some or all of which may be shared, as a form of Petri XE "Petri" -type-information XE "information"  transfer with systems of a comparable kind. (Petri.C.A, 1963, see also commentary by HoIt.A. in Bateson.C, Ed,1978). Since I formulated this idea, of P-Individuation, in the domain of psychological, educational or social affairs, it seemed sensible to use the term P-Individual XE "P-Individual"  for the entities in question. From an ordinary standpoint, my formulation was independent. But, within a few years of each other, Humberto Maturana came up, primarily in the domain of biology, with the term autopoiesis XE "autopoiesis" ,(Maturana.H.R, 1975,), which combined with structural openness, for example, in molecular exchange, is equi-significant with informational openness; similarly in domains of immunology and even biological cognition, Francisco Varela,(see Varela.F.,1975), came up with organizational-closure XE "organisational-closure"  and co-ontogeny. The fact is that they all describe the same fundamental phenomenon of life, albeit with minor variations. I doubt if any of us are so precocious or arrogant as to bid for priorities, and I am pretty certain that all of us doubt an absolute independence. The fact is that all of us worked with Heinz Von Foerster XE "Heinz Von Foerster" , at the B.C.L, University of Illinois,(Von Foerster.H.,1981,b,). Further, prescient work on self organization XE "self organisation" , his invaluable guidance and support XE "support"  are really at the root of any and all of these notions. Since, however, I formulated the idea of P-Individual in the psycho-social domain of education, complex decision making XE "decision making" , creativity, design and the like, the substrate upon which the productive XE "productive"  operations act is conceptual. Similarly, these productive operations are, also, conceptual operations. This formulation is open to the obvious criticism of talking about P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals"  as disembodied-minds (floating around, presumably, in some kind of ghostly limbo). It is not too difficult to counter this potential criticism, by saying that it so much nonsense, or, if needs be, showing it (for instance, by the argument that such minds would have no order to accommodate the most liberal of productive operations). However, there is probably no need to adopt such a stringent, nay pedantic, expedient. The fact is, any P-Individual is embodied in or incarnated in some one or more M-Individual XE "M-Individual" . The idea of a purely disembodied mind is almost as absurd as that of a dis-enminded body XE "dis-enminded body" , the prerogative of a few extravagant reductionists XE "reductionists"  adhering to the belief that if someone decomposed a brain, for example, into its components (neurones are popular candidates) and traced their connections (which would have changed over-and-over again since starting the investigation and the assiduous investigator had expired of utter exhaustion), the hypothetical investigator, would not have gained an inkling of the quirks or curiosity of the mind, maybe embodied in a specimen, until overcome by fatigue or fatality. The important point about P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals" , taken in an other-than-fatuous sense is that they ARE, surely, embodied or incarnated but that they may be embodied or incarnated in ANY appropriate fabric. For example, the very diversity of possible fabrications makes us recognise that artificial INTELLECT is far more apposite than artificial INTELLIGENCE and why in the world, IF such creatures DO exist, should they be dubbed ARTIFICIAL, any more so than people or Dolphins or horses, or dogs or other biological constructions. Here, I promulgate a point of view which may be deviant, but is not INTENDED to be a heresy, and on deep examination, believe is NOT one. Some may regard it as revolutionary, I prefer to regard it as evolutionary XE "evolution" , perhaps one of those hiccup-like bifurcations XE "bifurcations"  which from time-to-time beset an iterated-evolutionary XE "evolution"  process XE "process" . These occurrences typify any other-than-dogmatic evolutionary XE "evolution"  process, the dogma of pure Darwin and natural selection or that of the captain of the Beagle, subscribing with a different dogma to the same data.(Darwin, Dent, Everyman edition, 1972,). Professor Brainstawm XE "Professor Brainstawm" , an inventor with whom most of us were familiar when more youthful, is credited with the invention of an abolisher. As I recall the matter it was intended to abolish the dust from his workshop, which irritated his otherwise very tolerant housekeeper. Set in motion, the contrivance abolished the professor who was only reconstructed by the rapid and ingenious action XE "action" , taken by his housekeeper, in order to disabolish him and what little remained of the machine. I would like to abolish, reversibly or not but for preference without the Brainstawm contraption, both dis-en-minded bodies and disembodied minds. One is complementary to the other, if one exists, then so does the other, mind and body go hand in hand or glove in glove. This assertion appears in differing guises, notably as an exclusion XE "exclusion"  principle, to the effect that there are no Doppelgangers XE "Doppelgangers" . But, as we shall see later, the consequences of this and similar denials are dramatic and penetrate the most remote depths of existence. 2.4. LANGUAGE, PROTO-LANGUAGE, INTERFACES AND PROTO-LOGICS It is opportune to dwell for a slightly longer interval upon PIndividuals, surrounded, as they have been, by a host of caveats. That is because P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals"  are conversational participants XE "participants" , conversing in languages of various forms and modalities. If we are to capture at least some of their discourse, we need an interface between the conversational participants, for use under a rubric such as making a dynamic inscription of some of the concepts XE "concepts"  they share. An interface, formal or not, computer XE "computer"  implemented or not, is needed in order to exteriorise some, at least, of the joint mentation XE "mentation"  going on. It is at this point, also, that the protolanguage, Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , on which I claim all natural type languages to be founded, may be realised as a protologic the manipulations of which do, in a primitive, poverty stricken manner, reflect mind, thought and, in I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, the genesis of action XE "action"  as well. After some other considerations have been dealt with, I shall say much more about Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , in particular. For example, it will be hypothesised that Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  is a kind of linguistic field, that operations generating thoughts and penetrating conceptual boundaries within participants XE "participants" , excite the concepts XE "concepts"  bounded as oscillators, which, in ridding themselves of this surplus excitation, produce radiation in this field. It may encourage some readers to continue with this book, but it would be premature and it would seem zany to embark upon these fascinating matters until it has been possible to cover rather more ground. Regarding conversation XE "conversation" , why should participants XE "participants"  converse. There are doubtless several reasons, a very minor one being the often cited encounter by accident, of A bumping into B in the street. Apart from this happenstance, usually rare, there is the provision of an interface that catalyses, encourages and facilitates their interaction XE "interaction" . The point is most cogently made in pictures such as Fig. 1.(a), where the rectangulated enclosures represent the bounds of an M-Individual XE "M-Individual"  and the splodge like enclosures the bounds of P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals" , such as A and B. The interface, labelled as I in Fig. 1.(a), must surely be attractive, since the participants A and B, being housed in one brain, say, as partly autonomous but coupled mental organizations, could engage each other through transactions, internal to this organ. But, in fact, they often do exteriorise the concepts XE "concepts"  they share in external conversation through I, not by experimental coercion but provision of a properly and sympathetically designed interface. It is true that hypermedia, Dataspace and Cyberspace, XE "Cyberspace,"  aid the design and its efficacity, but it seems as though one ingredient, essential to the moderately consistent exteriorisation of shared concepts, is the fact that any interface incorporates a dynamic form of Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" . These comments apply to Fig. 1.(b), to Fig. 1.(c), and so on, but here their significance is obscured by the fact that the P-Individuals, engaged in conversation, occupy distinct M-Individuals XE "M-Individuals" . In practice, it does not matter, greatly. There are, for sure, many other reasons why participants XE "participants"  converse, for example because there is some kind of conflict, requiring conflict resolution and because of a fundamental affinity, an interaction XE "interaction"  of P-Individual XE "P-Individual"  and M-Individual XE "M-Individual" , which amounts to a willingness to speak to and hear from, to interact mutually, existing between A and B. This propensity 1 called amity XE "amity"  but Humberto Maturana has the courage to call it love XE "love" , its rightful name. To these matters we return, as the substance of I.A. XE "I.A."  theory emerges. 2.5. WHAT IS A PARTICIPANT? A participant XE "participant"  is a P-Individual XE "P-Individual" , as stated previously. But, in greater detail, what is it? It is a, knit together collection of coherent XE "coherent"  but distinct concepts XE "concepts" , themselves distinct within their coherent and distinct clusters, which may, within limits to be specified, overlap. All of these entities have the properties of the participant, they are organizationally closed XE "organisationally closed" , informationally open and distinct for, if they were not, if they formed a uniform smudge, why should they converse at all, how could they do so? 2.6. WHAT IS A CONVERSATION XE "CONVERSATION" ? Supposing that we do not inhabit such an obnoxiously amorphous countryside, it is not only possible to observe, and gather affirmatory observations to the effect that conversations DO take place, between participants XE "participants"  of any type, but, also, to show that conversations MUST take place, amongst other, comparable interactions. Fig. 2.' shows, in slightly greater detail, the interaction XE "interaction"  of participants A and B, through an interface labelled I. This, of course, is a special case and the most readily depicted. The languages, L, used by A and B, are derivable from Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , but are, otherwise, unrestricted with respect to form or modality. In fact, more fundamentally, a conversation XE "conversation"  is a larger closure of participants, a larger closure of P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals" . In greater detail, the truth value, equivalent to the existence value, of a conversation is an analogy XE "analogy" , having at least one similarity and at least one difference XE "difference"  and designated by a metaphor XE "metaphor"  or allegory XE "allegory" . It is peculiar insofar as, in the case of a conversation between A and B, the difference is between A and B, the participants, and the similarity is composed from the concepts XE "concepts"  that A and B share. 2.7. WHAT IS AN M-INDIVIDUAL? Strictly, any dynamic fabric able to accommodate a P-Individual XE "P-Individual" . It would be stupid, however, to be so undiscriminating. There is not the slightest doubt that the body, brain, humoral and related systems constitute an M-Individual XE "M-Individual"  of immense delicacy and refinement. As later, it is able, so are societies of people able, to frame, as in a picture frame, the otherwise unframed variety XE "variety"  of a haphazard environment. How far this depends upon our familiarity with our own species, how much upon our pride in being people, I am not entirely sure., on this score. No one denies that stars shine more brightly than people, emitting brighter light. The following proposition is less commonly accepted, but is far from outlandish, taking a star as a potential M Individual. It might be that stars are also brighter and more subtle in a mental sense, but not knowing them so well, it is hard to say. Regarding people, on the other hand, one indisputable fact, poignant for observers XE "observers" , is this. They may choose, aware of the consequences of their choice. It is certainly legitimate for a scientist, having knowingly excluded consciousness XE "consciousness"  from that which is, consciously, observed, to adopt an impartial, external, irresponsible stance, knowing and admitting full well that his or her reports are confined to a limited domain viewed through the spectacles of a deliberately limited methodology. It is a very different matter if someone concerned with the larger arenas, of society, organizations and so on are irresponsible enough, a pejorative in this context, to ape the manners of impartiality. Yes, scientists they may be, but scientists who claim, with no sound cause, to encompass consciousness in any enquiry of sensible consequence. Those who adopt that safe and faceless stance, are grotesque, pretentious and cowardly knaves, worthy of derogation. Those who have the courage to participate with others in a culture XE "cultures" , society, enterprise or organization under scrutiny, deserve respect. For in doing so, maybe as scientists, they bear the flag of J.B.S. Haldane XE "J.B.S. Haldane" , in the field of physiology, (Haldane,J.B.S, Biog, 1992). as actors XE "actors"  in a proper company of players. These actors have, willy nilly, taken on full and unconditional responsibility XE "responsibility" , accepting the risks involved, for their actions and interactions. 2.8. A TRANSITION At this juncture, it is opportune to make a transition from C.T XE "C.T" . and Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  to I.A. XE "I.A."  and a somewhat enhanced form of Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" . It sounds very trivial, but, in fact, it is rather complicated and its reverberations build up as they echo through the caverns of our intellect. The simple sounding statement is that an actor XE "actor"  in I.A. theory XE "I.A. theory"  is a participant XE "participant" , certainly, a variety XE "variety"  of P-Individual XE "P-Individual" , the M-Individuated embodiment of whom is able to act. Similarly, actors XE "actors"  can interact, often in conversational interaction XE "interaction"  and the varied languages invoked are, as before, modality free and derivable from an underlying Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" . But, fortunately, there is more to it than there seems to be. Fig.1, and Fig.2., IN HERE. CHAPTER3. REVISITATION, PRIOR TO ELABORATION. What actually happens in a conversation XE "conversation" , through an interface, between participants XE "participants" , who are realised as P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals" , A and B, embodied or incarnated in one or more M-Individuals XE "M-Individuals" , say, in brains. Insofar as there IS a conversation. If the previously stated dogmas are accepted, then there MUST be from time-to-time, and the participants use languages, L, derivable from Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , in order to reach agreements. It has already been noted that the term agreement XE "agreement" , includes agreement to disagree XE "agreement to disagree" , over something pivotal, like T. This may be,conversation XE "conversation"  about the "it" rather than "personally" referenced participants XE "participants" , like A and B, themselves, or any other participants implicated in the discourse. 3.1. DIALECTICAL AND DIALOGICAL PARADIGMS This dialogue usually takes the form of a dialectical, or dialogical debate in which the merits of various hypotheses are weighed up. Ideally, one collection of hypotheses is a thesis, proposed, by one of the participants XE "participants"  as a protagonist, whereas another collection, of OPPOSITE form, NOT usually a mere NEGATION, is espoused by other participants. The A, B XE "A, B" , dialogue may be heated, possibly acrimonious. But, more fruitfully it is not, permitting ample deliberation, in place of flagrant polemic. Given that, outright rejection of thesis or antithesis is replaced by the creation of a synthesis, in fact, to the creation of an analogy XE "analogy"  which is entirely novel. Of course, there are other modes of dialogue, polarised from the mundane to inspirational rhetoric. But there is a good sense in which dialectic or dialogical discourse is paradigmatic of conversation XE "conversation" , especially as its form varies from the idealism of Plato and to the more pragmatic, where theses, antitheses and syntheses, alike, but especially potential syntheses, must be demonstrated, as demanded by Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas, Abelard, Lullius and Marx, though somewhat neglected in favour of idealism by Hegel, or a curious vacillation he adopts in this matter not to mention the up-and-coming schools of modern French philosophy, a popular appellation, these days. If, for example, in the conduct of discourse over possible urban structures, you arrive at the synthesis" a city of paradise", then it must be demonstrably buildable, perhaps contingent upon the invention of entirely novel tower cranes and bulldozers, and open to habitation as at least one form of paradise. It would be useful to explain how the equipment neccessary for construction is manufactured, to explain why the inhabitants of this conurbation regard it as a paradise, rather than another Brasilia. But, strictly, it is only necessary to demonstrate the form and possibility of construction and habitation of this "city of paradise" in one of very many realities or universes of discourse. 3.2. KINEMATICS AND GENERAL PUNCTUATION If exchanges of a conversational type are paradigmatised as dialectical or dialogical dialogue, then they are punctuated, in the broadest sense of this word, by agreements and agreements to disagree. If it is felt that punctuation XE "punctuation"  is too strong a term, then replace each occurrence of the word by segmented, at certain junctures. In THIS respect, at least, conversations prove relatively easy to deal with in a formal manner but are not fully representative of all interactions between actors XE "actors"  (the participants XE "participants" ). Such unlimited interactions do not generally have a start XE "start"  and finish XE "finish" , a well specified beginning or ending. It is not intended to overstress these equi-significant points of punctuation XE "punctuation"  (or segmentation), of starting and finishing. In the first place, the restrictions are not so rigid as they sound, for example, a continuous conversation XE "conversation"  may be interrupted by phone calls that are irrelevant to the points under debate, however much momentary irritation they are likely to cause the participants XE "participants" . Similarly, no real loss of continuity is engendered if A and B are, for some reason or other, geographically displaced and unable to communicate, there are many exemplars of participants XE "participants"  who, upon re-encounter, resume their conversation XE "conversation"  at, or near, the point at which they left off, since the main threads of discourse hung end to end, usually twined or braided, are identifiable, A and B do have conversations. Consequently, conversation XE "conversation"  and that portion of its theory to be developed in detail, is, even within the constraints just outlined, a valuable way of imaging many social situations, far beyond the limits of the computer XE "computer"  implemented laboratory interface or those in which a participant XE "participant"  observer, such as a Piagetian Interviewer (Piaget.J, Eng Trans, 1952,)Д plays the interface role. The segmental continuity prevails and the punctuation XE "punctuation"  is that of agreement XE "agreement" , or agreement to disagree XE "agreement to disagree" , in short of meaning XE "meaning" . The idea of a continuous conversation XE "conversation"  is parodied in Fig. 3, and the supposed results of a successful transaction, in which at least one concept XE "concept" , here, a concept of T is shared, as a result of an A, B XE "A, B" , conversation, by the participants XE "participants" , A and B, in Fig. 4. At this juncture, a deliberately simplified and inadequate notation XE "notation"  is employed, in order to express some salient points as lucidly as possible. But the current notation IS and is KNOWN to be, an altogether inadequate representation of the underlying reality. In Fig. 3, we suppose that participants A and B have concepts XE "concepts"  TA and TB, their personal concepts of T which, whatever else, are distinct as A and B are distinct. An A,B, conversation goes on through an interface I at or in which a shared concept, designated T, without suffix, is dynamically inscribed. This conversation, which is, here, depicted as having a start XE "start" , say s, and a finish XE "finish" , say, f. But even in this simple interaction XE "interaction" , it is evident that some concept T is shared, that TA at the start will not be the same as TA, at the finish, the same applying to TB. In the figure, this fact is symbolised using the notation of TA(s), TA(f), which are NOT the same, of TB(s), TB(f), which are NOT the same, neither that nor is TA(s) the same as TB (s) or TA(f) the same as TB(f), if only by virtue of the fact that there is a shared concept, the concept of T. The greatly stripped down depiction of Fig. 4, is an attempt to show the bare skeleton of the most primitive mechanism. At the start of a conversation between A and B, the participants, A's starting concept of T, that is TA(s) is derived from A's starting concepts of Q, P and U, a mutually productive XE "productive"  and reproductive XE "reproductive"  concept cluster. Similarly, B's starting concept of T, namely, TB(s) is derived from a different cluster of starting concepts, from R and S, say. As the conversation finishes, A will have derived novel means of deriving T, influenced by but not identical to B's preferred meaning XE "meaning"  and, vice versa, B will most likely have done the same, only with respect to A's meanings, the productive and reproductive clusters in which A's concept of T and B's concept of T reside. The important feature, apart from showing one skeletal mechanism of concept XE "concept"  sharing, is that all the concepts XE "concepts"  productively and reproductively related are changed as a result of any conversation XE "conversation"  that does take place between participants XE "participants"  A and B, the entire process XE "process"  is dynamic and such interactions will, later on, be represented in a much more satisfactory form. Further, if we imagine (there is no good reason for doing so), that A and B are synchronous XE "synchronous" , it is possible to present figures such as Fig. 5. As a matter of fact, there is every reason to suppose the contrary (that A's temporal XE "temporal"  succession and B's temporal succession are very different, at most locally synchronised) and we shall soon drop this tacit assumption of preordained synchronicity XE "synchronicity" . It may be added that some emphasis upon the or dynamic of continually changing concepts XE "concepts"  is intended, in part, to remedy a defect in many or most of my previous publications. There I have frequently adopted the laudably intentioned path of assuming an impossible kinematic XE "kinematic"  image, under the false impression that it would make matters more lucid. Quite the contrary obtained, the apparent stasis associated with transformational pictures, dynamic flow, however inadequate, left out, served to confuse people. The simple kinematic XE "kinematic"  image, is an inadequate picture of mentation XE "mentation" . 3.3. SOME RESULTS It is, however, a useful temporary expedient to suppose that the t's of A and of B are held together by the t-like-succession of some external observer, insofar as it allows us to furnish results of the kind in Table 1, which are useful approximations. All findings, of C.T XE "C.T" . and I.A. XE "I.A."  theory are PREDICTIVE those in Table. 1, amongst them. As a cautionary reiteration, however, this claim does not usually mean numerically predictive, but predictive of some well specified configuration, a QUALITATIVE prediction XE "prediction"  but a rigorous one. They are NOT mere descriptions, of what has been previously observed. Further, they hold under far less rigid conditions, those of I.A. XE "I.A."  theory even, than the restricted conditions under which they are readily obtained. One major criticism of such prediction XE "prediction"  s, once the investigator has argued persuasively enough that they ARE predictions, is that they seem to predict the self evident, the OBVIOUS. Very likely the same comment applies to any science XE "science"  of consequence, or at any rate to consequential and interesting findings within any frame of reference having symmetries and connections which render it worth serious consideration. Whereas it is easy enough, if you enjoy trifling experiments, to reject, or tentatively accept small, slightly deviant, hypotheses, it takes hard thought, to come up with truly novel predictions. The former pursuit can often be conducted upon a technical basis, using tried and tested methods. It seldom calls for the invention of novel equipment, even novel techniques and, of course, it is essential work to do. It has the advantage of safety, since whatever the outcome of an experiment, it is unlikely to rock the boat, for it is addressed, mostly, to some matter of local significance. The latter pursuit calls for a lot of innovation XE "innovation" , intellectual and by way of methodology. It is risky, the investigator is liable to make a crashing bloomer, rather than a small mistake. It characterises, in varying degrees and in various ways all those groups in which I have participated. Above all, the emerging predictions are prone to meet with a "so what" reception. We reply, "yes, but is it OBVIOUS, to all??"It may be, from one point of view. For example, it is experientially obvious that I become unaware of a well learned skill XE "skill" , like walking, unless I stub my toe in the process XE "process" . It is a very different matter to rationally predict, on the basis of a theory, that awareness is prone to evaporate under some conditions and reappear under others. I may even become conscious of the event, share my awareness with others, passing strangers or the houseman on duty in an outpatient department. All this is experientially obvious, of course, experientially, but just WHY XE "WHY"  it is obvious remains far from clear, especially if people who resort to the "well, it is obvious" tautological, claptrap, are asked to essay some explanation of WHY or HOW. XE "HOW."  The established position in such matters is dogged, like the exponents of "nothing-but-tery", criticised by that brilliant thinker, Donald McKay, who I greatly respect but whom, when living, so I am told, regarded me as a minor devil incarnate. Hopefully he has revised that view, if he ever really entertained it. Similar comments apply to the other results, noted in Table. 1. They are all taken as obvious, at any rate most of them are. To our credit we DO essay some resolution of the problems proposed, to our discredit, these problems all deal with fairly circumscribed positions, important in education, design and complex decision making XE "decision making" , but rather narrow. Whilst these resolutions may be so very obvious to scientists who often prefer to opt out of mind and consciousness XE "consciousness" , to regard psychology as the maze running of white rats, I suspect that their reason for doing so is a little cowardly. Such questions as those of consciousness have answers, if any, bearing real political, social and organizational implications. Scientists MAY adopt the safe and steady stance, but, if they do so, then they can neither ascertain why or how, for example, we remain ourselves, after anaesthesia XE "anaesthesia"  or concussion or sleep, even though it is a manifest and self argued, scientific fact that no cell in our body is the same (but a reconstruction), that no molecule in our body, built as the reductionists XE "reductionists"  would have it, from a colligation of molecules or something, is the same (but, instead, a replacement). These comments apply, more vigorously, to the field of I.A. XE "I.A."  theory and its application. For, as stated already, this field encompasses societal, cultural, urban, national and international problems which are seldom well specified, but which remain intractable, chiefly because they suffer, immensely, from the obvious of platitudes and ideologies, so beloved as easy to comprehend, but not really obvious in the very least degree. Some, out of many, are tersely exemplified in Table. 2, but, here, I also refer to the appendix note on Stafford Beer XE "Stafford Beer"  and his viable system XE "system"  models. Why, for example, is it obvious that nations gnash their teeth at each other, that as an E.C. citizen, the social imperative is to take up arms against or even kill a person who is my friend but is called German or Russian as the political fashion has it, this season. You know and I know the insanity of war, above all, the professional military people know its insanity. But, as in restraining mad dogs and dangerous lunatics we are, all of us, aware of the atrocities going on and seek, by force XE "force"  if needs be, to eliminate the horrors of torture, persecution, pre-emption, terrorism, sadism, born of some powerful and power hungry caucus within one or any nation. Of one thing, at least, we are sure, that if conflict occurs amongst the obviously formed power blocks, be they national or multi-national-corporate, which go along with civilisation, it is not resolved by methods like more-and-more arms, flag waving and rhetoric, in short, of the same thing. This is a critical point, a point at which an appropriately different, innovative, method must be employed. At any rate, if that inventive act cannot be done in the slightly more cribbed, cabined and confined forum of a support XE "support"  system XE "system" , then it is obvious that civilisation will collapse to yield a life, if any, not worth living. In fact, it seems to me, there would be the void XE "void" . Maybe, it is obvious that conflict must occur in organizations of any magnitude, that it is required in order to inject difference XE "difference" , an ingredient just as important as coherence, since it has been stressed that unity is not uniformity. But its essential resolution at any level, critical at the level of larger and coherent XE "coherent"  systems, depends upon an ability to explain, even partially, the manners and mechanisms which currently prevail. Fig.3.,Fig.4.Fig5., Table.l., Table.2., in here. CHAPTER 4. A BROAD OUTLINE OF I.A. XE "I.A."  THEORY. It has already been stated that an ACTOR XE "ACTOR"  is a PARTICIPANT, thus a PIndividual but embodied in an M-Individual XE "M-Individual"  capable of ACTION XE "ACTION"  and a very general form of many languaged conversation XE "conversation" , known as INTERACTION XE "INTERACTION" . It is, however, necessary to enlarge the field encompassed by I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, beyond the bounds which are conveniently handled by C.T XE "C.T" . and an unmodified form of Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" . At a theoretical level, novel postulates must also be introduced and justified if only to represent a broader methodology and to adumbrate phenomena which have not, hitherto, been brought into the limelight. 4.1. SOME DIFFERENCES It seems perverse, at first sight, to set out certain differences XE "differences"  between C.T XE "C.T" . and I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, if only because their justification rests upon theoretical statements which have, so far, only been promised. However, if the reader will accept that this promise is fulfilled, mainly in Chapters 5, 6, then it renders the text more readable to do so. This bald statement rests, chiefly, upon the views expressed by a number of colleagues who have been kind enough to scan earlier versions of the manuscript and to discuss this matter. Their consensus is in favour of introducing the differences between C.T. and I.A., and a dynamic Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , informally, at this point and to present the theoretical axioms, inferences, and so on at a later stage, notably in Chapters 5, 6, some short appendices or summary figures and later volumes, a choice which seems to be determined by the form of the theories. A few months worth of intermittent thought, is called for. These are to be months spent in learning NOT to take-for-granted deep ideas which we DID take-for-granted, and this is a view which tallies with experience in other presentations of parts of these theories, which seem to be obscurely mathematical XE "mathematical"  to those unfamiliar with mathematical or formal philosophy and both arcane and outlandish to the mathematically ept, until, that is, they have either discussed them, personally, or thought about them. Hence, Table 3 is offered, at this point, as a cursory outline of C.T. and I.A. differences and some readers may wish to elucidate its content by reference to the later material. 4.2. IMPLICIT ETHIC Research in the OOC programme is clearly intended to be of use, at once or in the future. This, perhaps, is pre-supposed by one original meaning XE "meaning"  of Andragology XE "Andragology" , as the science XE "science"  of societal helping-systems, for example, with human organizations or human interactions through computing systems. It may, as in several ongoing or near completed projects, be addressed to systems immediately in operation, with the objective of improving performance, both of the people involved and the entire system XE "system" . However, apart from this important caveat, there are certain criteria, greatly expanded in later volumes of this series, but, for the moment, hinging upon at least the following. Namely, upon (a) and (b), as they are stated below. (a). The research is participatory, this applying, a fortiori, to researchers in the OOC programme, itself and (b). The notion of Andragology XE "Andragology"  as a science XE "science" , in contrast to a vaguely do-goodie-like activity, is emphasised. By SCIENCE, I do not necessarily, not usually, mean a pursuit such as chemistry or etymology. There is nothing wrong in doing so, if parts of our studies verge upon the classically scientific. Neither that, nor is there anything wrong with doing-good, quite the reverse, in fact, especially if that is appropriate to a particular project. Rather, I mean that our research is open to theoretical, if you like, to formal development, upon which it is possible to mount further research and, at least, make clear the meanings and intentions of what is in progress and what has been discovered by dint of current research. Very often, this calls for uncommon or novel theoretical tools and these may have value in themselves. Often, also, the scientific goal is an aim that is not, as yet, achieved in practice, still remaining in sight. But, interestingly enough it seems that the FORM of our theories approach, as in Chapter 5, the form of scientific theories. 4.3. OUTLINE STATEMENT Rather than burdening the reader with a great deal of verbiage, to spell out the research criteria precisely, an attempt is made to summarise them. This summary is the intended content of Table 4. and may be elaborated, considerably, for the most part in later volumes of this series. Although much of the tabulation is clear, it is worth bringing special attention to the need, in order to render a proper formalisation, to muster several unusual logical and mathematical XE "mathematical"  devices. These include, for example, a calculus XE "calculus"  of distinctions XE "distinctions" , (Spencer Brown.G, 1966), of dynamic coherence, (Rescher.N,1966.a,1980,b), of strict hermenutics, the progressive refinement of meaning XE "meaning" , as in ( Taylor.C,1964.a,1973.b.) and, independently, myself,as refd), of logics such as those of Gothard Gunther,( as in Gunther.G., 1960) of paradox, as in Hellerstein,(1981) of action XE "action" , as in Von Wright,G.H.(1963) of self and other reference, Maturana, Varela, and myself,(as refd) the mathematics XE "mathematics"  of Knot Theory, due, mainly, to Louis Kauffman,(as in Kauffman.L,1987.a.,1 987.b.) to the Algebra of Conscience, due to Lefebrve,( as in Lefebrve.V,(1982), to McCulloch's redundancy of potential command (McCuIloch,W.S.,1959), and, above all, to Heinz Von Foerster XE "Heinz Von Foerster" 's self organization XE "self organisation" (Von Foerster.H,1960.a.,1991,b.), which, in common with many of the others, keys into the Glanville theory of objects( see Glanville.R, 1991, for a condensation of his much earleir thesis).The diverse and captioned contents set out in Fig.33., somewhat elaborate upon this tabulation. 4.4. FURTHER EXPLICATION It would be usual to expand upon these less common calculi, logics and theories at this juncture. Whereas all of them are simple, once appreciated, they are often based upon unfamiliar foundations. For instance, even the arithmetic of distinctions XE "distinctions"  has a clearly stated but readily overlooked injunction. This is "draw a distinction XE "distinction" ", simple enough, by drawing a bounded figure in the sand, say. But if, in haste, one fails to recall that this injunction, "draw a distinction", prefixes every occurrence of a distinction, that the drawing surface might be spherical rather than planar, if so, then you are liable to fall into the fatal trap of supposing that the calculus XE "calculus"  is a fancified form of Sheffer Stroke algebra, which it is not, even though the works of Sheffer, Boole, de Morgan and many other great mathematicians may be veridically modelled in terms of the calculi of distinctions. 4.5. REGARDING DETAILS For this and comparable reasons 1 was persuaded to relegate expanded discussion of unfamiliar calculi, logics or theories for the most part to other volumes, giving only some bare essentials in Chapter 5. and Chapter 6. In fact, those colleagues who were kind enough to read earlier versions of the manuscript, positively insisted upon that arrangement of material. They pointed out, unanimously, that any attempt to do the usual would merely confuse the reader. There are only some terse, Appendix like Notes, in this volume. They will, hopefully, prove useful in themselves, also whilst reading Chapter 5. and Chapter 6., both of which are unashamedly, since unavoidably, slightly obscure. 4.6. SUBSEQUENT ORGANIZATION Henceforward, this book consists in Chapter .5. in which it is impracticable to avoid a modicum of symbolisim, in fact it is positively stuffed with symbolism. It delineates the bases of C.T XE "C.T" ., rather briefly, but in its latest form, similarly, Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" . It also contains those axioms, propositions and postulates needed to deal with I.A. XE "I.A."  theory and a few additional indications. Before moving on to Chapter 5 and its overt formalism, which is to me, at any rate, indigestible material, it seems prudent to enlarge upon the complete but terse summaries, presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Consequently, let us decorate these tables with certain ancillary comments. After all, our often-puritanical-Victorian ancestors, felt obliged, out of decency, zealotry and the like, to clad the parlour chair's wooden legs with little skirts of fine silk-cloth, matched to that of the antimacassars, in order to hide these indecent members from overly-sensitive visitors. This, also, is decoration. Readers with formally biased intellectual prowess are likely to find the bald tables, hard to stomach. But it was virtually impossible for me to articulate the bare claims at all adequately, before constructing a mental bridge between the tabulated statements and their formalism until their relations XE "relations"  had received attention and a measure of careful rumination. In this case, it is not prudery that counts but. rather, the sense and intelligibility of the entire manuscript. In particular, I allude to the next Chapters 5, 6, at most summarised in the tables, which I, at any rate, find to be dense reading. The fundamental IDEAS behind C.T XE "C.T" . and I.A. XE "I.A."  Theory have very similar roots, but both refer to variants of Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" . Initially, Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  implementations should be released from their, currently kinematic XE "kinematic" , forms into the wider domain of kinesis XE "kinesis"  and the dynamics XE "dynamics"  of life. That is a project underway, entirely realisable, but, as yet, not satisfactorily completed, except, perhaps, in part. To phrase this matter in slightly different terms, a dynamic mesh XE "mesh"  or Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  representation, essential to I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, can be used as it is, for all C.T XE "C.T" . interactions. That is because of the tacit assumption that conversations have a "start XE "start" " and a "finish XE "finish" ", however much they may be interrupted, in between. It is also quite possible to freeze or fix the values of certain mesh parameters, using the mesh as an approximate frame of reference, in C.T. based studies. That is, in fact, because, of the inherent C.T. punctuation XE "punctuation" , a matter considered earlier. Using this, and several, closely related notions, it is entirely possible to convert statements, theories, findings and so on, into the jargon of C.T. Not infrequently, the reverse process XE "process"  of translation, is in a more pernickety sense, also, possible. The theories in question, C.T XE "C.T" . and I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, have, naturally enough, much in common. They commensualise XE "commensualise" , if the following. important. matters are kept very firmly in mind. (1). The conservation XE "conservation"  of permissive application XE "permissive application" , of mandatory application XE "mandatory application" , and difference XE "difference"  are common to BOTH theories. (2). Concepts applied, permissively or by mandate, give rise to products XE "products"  and a process XE "process" -product XE "process-product"  complementarity XE "complementarity"  also applies to C.T XE "C.T" . and to I.A. XE "I.A."  theory. Similarly, both theories rely upon SIMILAR though not entirely IDENTICAL notions of concept XE "concept"  production XE "production" , reproduction and deflection to maintain distinction XE "distinction" , (and thus, identity), distinction conserved over concepts XE "concepts" , any participant XE "participant"  or group of them. This requirement, it will be shown, requires the conservation XE "conservation"  of an orthogonal operator, "Un XE "Un" ", to be identified with thought, in contrast to mentation XE "mentation" . (3). The form of the recursive specification of a concept XE "concept"  or a PIndividual is much the same in both theories but the base specification differs because of the essential multiplicity of temporality or succession in I.A. XE "I.A."  theory which may (but need not always), be obtrusive in C.T XE "C.T" . So is the specification of any MIndividual, able to incarnate or embody P-Individual XE "P-Individual" -minds. (4). Even in C.T., we must acknowledge that the programmatic or algorithmic part of a concept is continually rewritten, especially so whilst this concept is being applied. In this sense a concept MUST evolve. But, in I.A. theory XE "I.A. theory" , it is necessary to recognise that the one or more M-Individuals XE "M-Individuals"  which embody the P-Individual, also, of necessity, evolve. (5). Further, concepts XE "concepts"  are continually constructed and reconstructed from other concepts with which, because of this, they form coherent XE "coherent"  clusters XE "coherent clusters"  of various kinds. However, the concepts belonging to such a cluster, entire bundles or meshes XE "meshes"  of which constitute a minimal P-Individual XE "P-Individual" , retain their integrity as distinct concepts. In other words, distinction XE "distinction"  is preserved, a fact which may be imaged by an oppositely oriented cohesive force XE "force" , - holding concepts together and representing their adherence in clusters as a distinction conserving process XE "process" , acting in a (topolgically) orthogonal direction ( see.2.) to cohesive forces of any orientation, clockwise XE "clockwise"  or anti clockwise as it may be, penetrating the distinctions XE "distinctions"  created by the conceptual-processes, themselves. I used to employ the phrase"at right angles to"( and wish to thank Peter Martyns for indicating possible confusions, as with Euclidean Vector Spaces). We return to these points, in (10), below. (6). In I.A. XE "I.A."  theory, it is also important to recognise that the PIndividual evolution XE "evolution"  and the M-Individual XE "M-Individual"  evolution are inextricably coupled, since this is where we MUST, not only may, implicate AMITY or LOVE, as a willingness to engage in interaction XE "interaction" , to socialise. There is no brain cell making you love XE "love"  me, interact with me, or if there is, then, like the unique pleasure centre, or the unique homunculus, it is an accident, perhaps it is a very expedient one. But it is not required for personal affection and sentience, the main qualities/quantities, conserved and perpetually evolving/developing, in the dynamic of C.T XE "C.T" . or I.A theory. (7). All of these dynamic and evolutionary XE "evolution"  processes are, very often, usefully visualised in C.T XE "C.T" . by a start XE "start"  and a finish XE "finish"  paradigm. In I.A. XE "I.A."  Theory it is rarely, if ever, possible to recognise the start and the finish of an interaction XE "interaction" . (8). In some interactions, this is due to the irregular and often enough knotted strands of a temporal XE "temporal"  or causal co-ordinate. Thus P-Individuals, however embodied, MUST evolve. Similarly, the embodying M-Individuals XE "M-Individuals" , MUST evolve. Their evolution XE "evolution"  and their relative rates of evolution are not, on the whole synchronised, as by a clock which is common to all of them, neither that, nor are they somehow pre-set. The otherwise asynchronous is rendered synchronous XE "synchronous"  by the necessities of interaction XE "interaction" , ordaining local synchronicity XE "synchronicity" , only. If needs be, we may note the non-linear dynamics XE "dynamics"  of any productive XE "productive"  and reproductive XE "reproductive"  process XE "process" , concurrent with the processes that are reproduced, applied to form ordered pairs, that is, concepts XE "concepts" . It is clear that haphazard perturbations, from beyond the horizon of the distinctive carapace, symbollically the product of conceptual processes, an organism itself, may contribute variety XE "variety"  to the system XE "system" , but they are inessential, the predictable chaos of non linear, iterated, processes, approaching a chaotic attractor XE "chaotic attractor"  would provide sufficient variety to suffice, were there no perturbations from an outside. (9). These facts give rise to a necessary awareness (that is, a Petri XE "Petri"  Type information XE "information"  transfer). In I.A. XE "I.A." , also C.T XE "C.T" ., a measure of consciousness XE "consciousness" , is a (Petri type ) information exchange relation, in or between participants XE "participants" . This is an index for the amount of awareness, or the amount of informational interaction XE "interaction" . The MEANING, invariably attached to this AMOUNT, depends upon the concepts XE "concepts"  envisioned by one participant XE "participant" , or shared between several participants who are interacting. (10). In C.T XE "C.T" . and in Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  there is a process XE "process"  of unfoldment XE "unfoldment"  (see.2.) which is conserved, and orthogonal to the oriented dynamic of mentation XE "mentation" . Since it crosses the distinctions XE "distinctions"  created by conceptual processes (hence, as later, directional in contrast to oriented), but bears the orientation signature of its origin. It excites processes within the self created boundaries of concepts XE "concepts"  or the participants XE "participants" , composed of them. It is interpreted as thought, and its subsequent emission is radiation like. Hence, transactions in C.T. may be regarded as a resonance XE "resonance" , in some Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  linguistic field shared by the participants. In C.T., we may, but need not necessarily, deal with action XE "action"  as the coalescence of distinctly oriented unfoldments XE "unfoldments" , determining, by their orientation signatured direction, and an ordered domain of interpretation. Usually this domain is generated by a prepositional operator XE "prepositional operator"  mesh XE "mesh" , analogically related to some characterising mesh, but of opposite orientation, as, also, are the signatures XE "signatures"  of its directed unfoldments. If directed unfoldments of opposite orientation signature impinge, together, upon the same opaque distinction XE "distinction" , then they cancel, to produce action of the actor XE "actor"  in whom this event takes place. (11). In l.A. Theory, action XE "action" , the absolute, must depend upon a prepositional operator XE "prepositional operator"  mesh XE "mesh" , determining the meaning XE "meaning" , direction in a given domain, of actions generated by streams of thought, under some legitimate unfoldment XE "unfoldment" . Formally, action is characterised by the cancellation of orientations attached to directional unfoldments XE "unfoldments" . (12). In I.A. XE "I.A."  theory it is possible to handle intra-personal and interpersonal interaction XE "interaction" . The basis of this facility is that we may write expressions, comparable to TA=A(T), or TB=B(T), like AB=B(A) or BA= A(B), or, in general, expressions like ZZ = Z XE "Z" (Z) and so on. These few clauses, namely clause (1), to clause (12), offer but a vague, unduly global, overview. Their stated intention is to provide such an overview, not a cack handed attempt at explanation of the contents of Chapter 6. Only by examination of Chapter 5, or its equivalent, is it possible to gain an appreciation of the theories in question, namely C.T XE "C.T" ., Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)" , and I.A. XE "I.A."  Theory and, since analogies XE "analogies"  have a peculiar significance in this undertaking, there is ample justification for the fairly large portion of the Chapter which is devoted to analogy XE "analogy"  and metaphor XE "metaphor" . It is assumed that allegory XE "allegory" , like metaphor and anaphor XE "anaphor" , designate immediate and past referential analogies. That is, to demonstrate some sequence or story dominated by analogies. Quite often, the term analogy XE "analogy"  is used for any kind or collection of analogies XE "analogies" , all having a specific similarity and a specific difference XE "difference"  or named distinction XE "distinction" . The next volume in our series will show, as concisely as possible, explications of notions which appear in the forthcoming discussion but which are, very readily, overlooked. Table.3., Table.4., in here. CHAPTER 5 SOME SYMBOLIC NOTATIONS REQUIRED FOR TERSE EXPOSITION. In order to avoid, so far as is possible, repetitious and unduly embedded statements, a modicum of symbolic notation XE "notation"  (and, along with it, some formalism), is required at this point in the discussion. The extent of this proliferation is limited by consigning much of it to the later volumes and Fig.33.. This is a possibly worthy but also rather inept effort to get around a maxim (recommended to and promulgated by Steven Hawkins in his recent," A brief history of Time XE "Time" "), a book about the genesis and character of Time, (Hawkins, S.W., 1988), to the effect that for every equation or mathematical XE "mathematical"  symbolic-expression you introduce, as an author, you are likely to loose half your potential readers. Neither he nor, on a lesser scale, I, DO wish to LOSE readers. For myself, I have adopted the expedient of providing a rather liberally sized further volume in the series, to which is allocated much of the fundamental argument in favour of certain, otherwise platitudinous derivations, inferences and the like. Briefly, this Chapter 5, also, Chapter 6, are intended to furnish the minimal requirement for rational development of the notions proposed. The parts missed out, since experience has shown that they are apt to be misleading initially, whilst exhilarating later on, are alluded to, if at all, as further volume matters. At any rate, this expedient, of scuttering around the significant to begin with, though approaching it later on; or, of carving up the field of enquiry in a somewhat arbitrary manner; are, largely, fabrications. !n any case they yield the following subdivisions, distinctions XE "distinctions"  made by observers XE "observers" , for their own convenience, rather than hewn from the rock of intellect, BY the intellect, and FOR cogent observation. They are mere differences XE "differences" , possibly distractions. But, all the same can be useful and of value to observers and participants XE "participants"  and actors XE "actors" , alike, if aware of their limitations. It is a little ironic, since in the following clauses and paragraphs we distinguish certain context dependent styles of learning and creativity, to point out that people, taken as a whole, tend to be analytic, to dissect their worlds in the manner of the clauses to follow, and order them linearly. Personally, I find the layout anathematic, but that is probably because I have lived with the stuff for so long and prefer to see it globally. One way of subscribing to this prevalent and linear fashion is to number the stepwise arrangement of bits and pieces from the dissecting table, using Roman Numerals as sufficiently dignified to be main headings. THIS is what we shall do, in the present Chapter, and THAT is why we do it. So, let us proceed. (I). DEFINITIONS OF MAIN TERMS. (1). Let Z XE "Z" =A, B XE "A, B" , ..... and so on, index participants XE "participants" . (2). Let T, Q, P, R, S, U, V,..... stand for the NAMES of CONCEPTS, insofar as real concepts XE "concepts" , bearing but NOT at all BEING this name or label. Let T be a representative symbol, over the set of NAMES or LABELS. Let i, j, such that i is not equal to j but, also, such that i has a range from 0 to a finite number, say n, and j has a range from 0 to some finite number, say m, be auxiliary indices, employed to give specificity or particularity to any one-or-other entity. (3). Let Prog(T) XE "Prog(T)"  designate an algorithmic like entity, or a collection of them, such as Prog i (T), Prog j (T), ...., which, if compiled or interpreted (in the broad and philosophical sense) gives rise to a product, named T. (4). Let Proc(T) XE "Proc(T)"  be the compiled or interpreted form of Prog(T) XE "Prog(T)" , that is a form capable of application, as it stands interpreted in any competent, appropriate and dynamic medium, to yield a product, namely, D(T) XE "D(T)" . (5). Let ProcZ(T) be a procedure, namely, such an interpretation in the fabric of a participant XE "participant" , Z XE "Z" , which is applicable to yield either DZ(T) or else dZ XE "dZ" , a member of the set DZ(T). (6). Let it be ORDAINED that D(T) XE "D(T)" , d member of D(T), or dZ XE "dZ"  of DZ(T) contains as a member, or includes as a proper or improper subset one or more Prog(T) XE "Prog(T)" , for Prog(T), are one or more strings XE "strings"  of symbols, albeit instructional, upon interpretation. As they stand, however, they are surely set members or subsets, perhaps of an arbitrarily large Cartesian Product set. On the contrary, ProcZ, especially since modified under application, most certainly is not a set element or a subset. Some explication is needed, at this juncture, in order to avoid possible confusion. Whereas Prog(T), Prog i (T) and so on are indubitably set elements or subsets, Proc(T) XE "Proc(T)"  or Proc i (T) are definitively NOT such things. For example, whilst it is harmless jargon in computer XE "computer"  science XE "science" , having a computer, operating system XE "system"  and programming XE "programming"  language in mind, to say this program may be executed or that it is under execution XE "execution" , it is, in the general case, utter NONSENSE. For, in the computer science case, operating system, programming language and so on, are, rightly enough, taken for granted, they are not so, in the case of brains and societies. That, incidentally, is why we consistently employ the somewhat broader application, or Ap XE "Ap" , in place of Execution or Ex XE "Ex" , implying not only that execution is in a computer of some kind but, also, in a serial machine, built to satisfy the essentially serial algebras of Church, Markoff, Turing, Von Neumann and others. In contrast, Ap permits activation in any system, a brain, a society, a Petri XE "Petri"  Net, as a limiting case, in a standard computing machine. (7). Let Con stand for a coherent XE "coherent" , serial, parallel or concurrent colligation of Proc, as the name suggests, a concept XE "concept"  procedure such that if Ap XE "Ap" (Con(T) XE "Con(T)" )==>, then D(T) XE "D(T)" , so that the complementary pair indicates a Concept, proper, as represented without subscript, at an Lp XE "Lp (proto-logic)"  interface. Also, let Con' be of the form concept XE "concept" , but a concept that acts upon other concepts XE "concepts"  to produce and, incidentally reproduce the same or fresh ones. That is, for any viable or stable concept, we have, given Ap XE "Ap"  occurring Ap(Con* XE "Con*" ())==>, for any T, or, in general, that there is a complementarity XE "complementarity"  of the type . (8). Let ConZ(T) XE "ConZ(T)"  signify one of Z XE "Z" 's concepts XE "concepts" , here of a concept XE "concept" , equisignificantly a skill XE "skill" , named T. (9). Let Con*Z XE "Z"  be a productive XE "productive"  and, incidentally, reproductive XE "reproductive"  operator of the form Con but peculiar to participant XE "participant"  Z, such that Ap XE "Ap" (ConZ'())==>some such that it is coherent XE "coherent"  with Z's repertoire of concepts XE "concepts"  and their clusters ( as below), It follows, from the previous clauses, that there is a complementarity XE "complementarity" , Con* XE "Con*" =. Further, regarded in its CANONICAL form, a MINIMAL P-Individual XE "P-Individual" , a minimal participantZ's extent, IS the SCOPE of Con*Z XE "Con*Z" , although more extensive forms may, obviously, exist. The complementarity XE "complementarity"  ConZ* = accounts for the prediction XE "prediction" , in C.T XE "C.T" ., that P-Individuals XE "P-Individuals"  or context-dependent participants XE "participants"  may have dominant learning and innovative styles, in much of the literature Con+Z being written "Description Building", or DB and Con-Z being written "procedure building ", or PB types of mentation XE "mentation" , these predictions being verified by empirical evidence. There is even stronger empirical support XE "support"  for the fact that both modes of conceptualisation are needed to acheive understanding XE "understanding"  of a concept XE "concept" , which once understood may become more difficult to acess but is ineradicable. (10). Let Ap XE "Ap" (.... ) be a permissive, that is MAY not MUST operator, conserved or evolving over any P-Individual XE "P-Individual" . Let the composite form, namely of &(Ap(..... )), be an imperative operator, conserved or evolving over any P-Individual, signifying that at least one of those things, permitted by Ap, given an & prefix, must in fact be done. (11). No concept XE "concept"  may exist upon its own, only in a collegiate relation to other concepts XE "concepts"  which form a cluster (as above) and are mutually responsible for production XE "production"  and reproduction. (12). Any concept XE "concept"  encompasses an indefinitely large number of refinements, of the concept. Any concept is, also, a generalisation. As the value of a convers